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ABSTRACT
Prior works in the social sciences have demonstrated the importance that television can
have in shaping the views and outlooks of viewers. Studies have examined how it is that overtly
political broadcasting, such as political commercials or ideological cable news channels, can
impact viewers. However, precious little scholarship in the field of political science has been
devoted to examining how non-news programming, the lion’s share of what is shown on
television, can shape and mold viewers’ outlooks and opinions. Television programming is often
built around conflict, presenting a distorted view of the world wherein certain “in-groups,”
mainly the assumed audience of the broadcast, are invited to ridicule or feel hostility towards
certain “out-groups.” It is hypothesized that non-news programming can influence how
television viewers feel toward the “out-groups” targeted for ridicule or exclusion in their
broadcasts.
In order to test this hypothesis, both statistical analysis of pre-assembled data and an
experimental design will be utilized. Cross-sectional data assembled by GSS and Annenberg will
be analyzed using logit and ordinary least square models. Controlling for the socio-demographic,
partisan, and ideological characteristics of a typical viewer of late-night satirical broadcasting or
religious broadcasting, it is demonstrated that increased viewing of these types of television
programs is significantly correlated with increased antipathy toward the “out-groups” or public
figures held up for scorn or ridicule during these programs.
The experimental design involves an online survey where respondents answered a series
of questions pertaining to their political views, political knowledge, and socio-demographic
characteristics. Respondents were then randomly selected to be exposed to one of three video
clips, one of religious broadcasting discussing California’s Proposition 8, one of satirical
broadcasting discussing California’s Proposition 8, and a sample of network news discussing the
same issue. A post-screening questionnaire regarding feelings towards targeted out-groups was
then administered to the subjects. Exposure non-news television programming increased
antipathy toward the “out-groups” targeted for hostility or ridicule within the television clips.
ii

DEDICATION
To the memory of Salvatore Santo Russo (1948-2008). Endless gratitude goes to three incredible
women in my life: Eileen Russo, Alana Russo and Chelsea Ratcliff.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The completion of this dissertation would not have been possible without the tireless
efforts of Professors Richard Forgette, Jonathan Winburn, Michael Henderson and Mark van
Boening. Their vision and dedication has enabled this project to come to fruition, and I am
grateful for their guidance in every aspect of completing this dissertation, from methodological
concerns to my own neuroses. Credit belongs to them for any utility one may derive from my
research; any mistakes remain my own. I am grateful to the Institute for Humane Studies for
their generosity during my final year of graduate school. Finally, very special thanks to my
“Tech People” Chris West, Phillippe St. Gerard and Marc Pane, without whose mechanical,
artistic and audio-visual know-how, this project never would have gotten off the ground.

iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................ ii
DEDICATION ................................................................................................................... iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iv
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................1
II. THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................16
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: NON-NEWS SOURCES AND PROPOSITION 8 .....36
IV. ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA ..........................................................59
V. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................87
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................................................................................................93
APPENDIX ......................................................................................................................108
VITA ................................................................................................................................115

v

LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Expected Results ..........................................................................................................13
3.1 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Homosexuals” Scores..................................48
3.2 OLS and Logit Estimations ..........................................................................................51
3.3 Comparison of Proportions of Subjects Opposed to Gay Marriage ............................53
3.4 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward the Church of Latter-Day Saints” Scores ....55
3.5 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Conservative Christian” Scores...................56
4.1 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views Towards
Homosexuals ......................................................................................................................74
4.2 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views Towards
Republican Platform Positions...........................................................................................77
4.3 OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George W. Bush: Positive
Personality Traits ...............................................................................................................80
4.4 OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George W. Bush: Negative
Personality Traits ...............................................................................................................81

vi

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Americans watch more TV than the citizens of any other nation in the world (Gilson
2009). There are more television sets in the United States than toilets (American Psychological
Association 1993; Bushman 2005). Like many other forms of media, television satisfies a myriad
of needs and wants (Abelman 1987; Katz, Blumler and Gurevitch 1974). Of particular interest to
political scientists, one of the needs satisfied by television is the need for information, including
political information. Eighty percent of respondents in a recent survey in the United States
replied that they regularly watch television news programs (Chen and Suen 2008), “and adults
spend significantly more time with television than with any other medium” (Bushman 2005; 702;
Television Bureau of Advertising 2003). While there is a substantial body of work exploring the
influence that television news, political programming, and campaign advertising can have on
those exposed to its messages, there is comparatively little work on the influence that non-news
television programming can have on television viewers.
Non-news television broadcasts can present the world in an “us vs. them” manner, where
certain out-groups are targets for ridicule or hostility (Bruce 1990; Carr 1992; Hughey 1990;
Straub 1988). This presentation can influence how viewers of these programs feel toward those
targeted out-groups. Using the case studies of religious television programming and satirical
television programming, this work seeks to demonstrate how television programs can shape
opinions towards targeted out-groups. Furthermore, this work discusses the potential political
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ramifications of this effect. Religious and satirical programs were selected as case studies
because of the popularity of both forms of programming and their relevance to the field of
political science. Both forms of television media frequently carry disguised political messages,
masked as pure entertainment in the case of satirical programs or spiritually uplifting messages
in the case of religious programming, another compelling reason for the use of religious and
satirical media as case studies.
Viewers of religious programming presumably seek to satisfy some spiritual desire,
rather than to obtain political news. "The sermons, the preaching, the music, the experience of
‘having your spirits lifted’ and ‘feeling close to God’ are frequently expressed satisfactions that
viewers derive from religious programs" (Gerbner et al. 1984; 4). Similarly, the viewers of The
Daily Show with Jon Stewart1, Late Night with David Letterman or The Tonight Show with Jay
Leno presumably seek entertainment. However, both religious program viewers and satirical
program viewers may find their political attitudes and beliefs being shaped, even when they may
not have intended to gain any sort of political information from the program they are watching.
Due to their interest in receiving the messages of the program they are watching, viewers are
susceptible to receiving and processing the political messages that are being transmitted within
the satirical or religious context of the program (Zaller 1992).
Baum and Jamison (2006) argue that political content, when presented in an
“entertaining context,” can be “piggybacked (i.e., attached) to information intended primarily to
entertain, and hence consumed incidentally,” thus allowing ostensibly apolitical programming to
inform those viewers who have low levels of interest in politics and low levels of knowledge of
politics (Baum and Jamison 2006; 948). This work affirms Baum and Jamison in that
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Hereafter referred to as The Daily Show for the sake of brevity.
2

programming designed to be consumed by those not seeking political information can, in fact,
inform viewers. Baum and Jamison (2006) conclude by implying that low-information voters
utilize “soft news” sources, such as daytime talk shows, to provide them with the information
that they need in order to make informed decisions. This work takes a different direction from
Baum and Jamison (2006) by arguing that political views and attitudes can be transmitted
through programming that presents itself as serving a primary role other than that of supplying
political information and to audiences who are not necessarily seeking political information.
Previous academic work has discussed the impact of television (McLuhan 1964; Mutz
and Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976) as well as the impact print and television media has upon
those who receive mass media messages (Bartels 1993; Lippman 1922; McCombs and Shaw
1972; Mutz 1998; Noelle-Neuman 1974; Zaller 1992; Zaller 1996). This work will build upon
these sources as well as the present literature that discusses media effects from overtly political
sources (Goldstein and Freedman 2002; Groseclose 2011; Freedman and Goldstein 1999;
Valentino et al. 2008). This dissertation also will add to the extant scholarship that has sought to
empirically demonstrate that, broadly speaking, media matters. This dissertation then will
diverge from much of the existing literature by addressing the impact that political information
has upon the political outlooks and attitudes of those who receive its messages when the
information is being transmitted through what shall be referred to in this work as non-news
sources. Non-news sources refers to television programs that are not “news programs” in the
traditional sense, and are not broadcast on cable news networks, that nonetheless present political
content with consistent, specific framing and priming. Consistent, specific framing and priming,
means that these media sources do not generally diverge from how they present their chosen outgroups and in-groups. Today’s enemy is not going to be tomorrow’s friend. Non-news sources
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have set, distinct ideological and social views of the world, and these views are transmitted to
their audiences within a television format that is salient to their audience. While non-traditional
news sources can take many forms, the case studies are religious television and satirical
television, which were chosen because of their popularity, their relevance to political science,
and their systematic targeting of out-groups for scorn or condemnation.
The following statistics detail the popularity of religious and satirical television, as well
as their relevance to political science. Conservative estimates of viewership for religious
television place it around 15-20 million Americans per week (Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover
1987). Much of the literature exploring religious television is from the heyday of televangelists
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including work describing Pat Robertson’s run for the
Republican nomination for President in 1988. Satirical media has been seemingly rediscovered
by the academy due to the rise in popularity of The Daily Show and The Colbert Report. The
Pew Research Center 2012 Biennial Media Consumption Study states that approximately 26% of
the American public watched The Daily Show “at least sometimes” and 23% said the same about
The Colbert Report (Forgette, Morris and Russo 2013, Pew 2012). As will be explored later,
both forms of television repeatedly target particular social out-groups for ridicule, derision or
condemnation (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Prior
works have explored how framing and priming takes place within the context of television.
Television Effects
With the rise of the 24-hour news cycle and ideologically driven cable news outlets,
political scientists are increasingly interested in how television news outlets politically frame
stories and prime their viewers. For example, academic studies validated the conventional
wisdom and empirically demonstrated that Fox News presents content significantly to the right
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of other mainstream television news sources (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Groseclose and
Milyo 2005). Building from these studies, researchers have also demonstrated that the public’s
perceptions on political matters can be and are affected by the ideological content of the news
media messages that viewers consume (Groseclose 2011). Martin (2008) and Mutz (1998)
demonstrated that media also subtly influences politics by "…informing beliefs about social
reality that in turn shape political attitudes and behavior" (Martin 2008; 181). Thus, media can
cause viewers to change their political beliefs and attitudes by directly appealing to political
ideology, (e.g., the policies of Party X are bad for America), or in less direct ways. A subtle
approach to influencing the public could include choosing the issues on which a television news
program will focus. How a news program reports the issues is another less direct method of
influencing the viewers’ attitudes (Ebring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980; McCombs and Shaw
1972). This work contends that non-news sources also influence the political beliefs and attitudes
of their viewers.
In a discussion about any form of media, it is necessary to pay attention to the consumers
of that media. All television viewers are not created equal. Viewers’ attitudes and experiences
can shape the way they interpret media messages (Sharp and Joslyn 2001). Case in point,
viewers of differing levels of political sophistication will be affected in different ways by what
they see on television (Bartels 1993; Zaller 1992; 1996). Viewers who do not already have
coherent political ideologies or sufficient prior knowledge of political affairs and events do not
have the necessary political maturity to mount a defense to the sophisticated arguments being
presented to them on television by news sources (Campbell et al. 1960; Price and Zaller 1993;
Zaller 1992; 1996). Following this logic, this research shows that non-news sources can mold
and shape the perceptions of viewers because their messages are not overt. It is further argued
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that even sophisticated viewers may have their guard lowered and thus be ripe for media
manipulation when they are exposed to political content in non-news sources. Non-news sources
also reach the large numbers of Americans who are politically uninformed and unsophisticated,
and, voluntarily or otherwise, do not expose themselves to news or televised political
programming. “The most common mechanisms by which voters are purportedly able to resist
dissonant media messages--such as selective reception, attention and retention (Campbell et al.
1960)--may simply be less applicable to (entertainment) talk shows, at least for low-awareness
voters” (Baum 2005; 231).
In the same vein, Robinson (1976) and other proponents of the “videomalaise” theory
mention the case of accidental news viewers. Videomalaise, a theory initially advanced by
scholars such as Robinson (1976) and Dahl (1967), suggests that increased exposure to television
journalism, or even just television itself, has a detrimental effect on the "national political ethos”
(Robinson 1976; 411). By being bombarded with negative television news reports, television
viewers grow increasingly distrustful of established political and social institutions. Additionally,
they grow increasingly skeptical and cynical as they continually consume the kind of conflictdriven, sensationalized news stories that television readily offers. Robinson (1976) particularly
feared that viewers who lacked political sophistication would be a kind of collateral damage of
the media messages disseminated by television news programs. To Robinson, viewers with
limited exposure to television news are accidental viewers who are too politically
unsophisticated to properly process the news. Consequently, they become TV casualties--cynical
and fearful. Videomalaise theory highlights why this research project is focusing on television to
the exclusion of other forms of media (i.e., newspapers, the internet, etc.) Videomalaise theory
also offers reasons why bombardment by television programming results in mostly negative
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changes in views towards specific political figures and social groups. Robinson (1976) and
others have highlighted how television focuses on conflict and how it presents a distorted, more
intense, and more aggressive version of reality than exists outside of the small screen (Forgette
and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005). Not only is there an overall
media effect, but television has a singularly negative impact on the outlooks and attitudes of
viewers.
Religious Media: An Overview
Do the viewers of religious broadcasting differ not only from the general population, but
also from other religious Americans? In what way should consumers of religious media be
expected to differ? On one hand, there is an overt “us vs. them” mindset to the theology of many
religious broadcasters. Those who tune in are “saved,” but the rest of society is not. Specific outgroups in society are often targeted for ridicule and scorn, such as homosexuals and atheists
(Straub 1988). When this theology is coupled with the confrontational nature of television itself
(Forgette and Morris 2006; Robinson 1975; Robinson 1976), it is expected that consumers of
religious media should be more hostile to targeted out-groups than those who do not consume
religious media. These results should hold even when controlling for the conservatism or
religiosity of the consumer.
Campbell (2006) argued that evangelical Christians see themselves as living in a distinct
society within society. Assuming that much of this feeling of intra-societal alienation derives
from their religious conservatism--which considers contemporary secular American society to be
strewn with sinfulness--it follows that one may think consumers of religious media would feel
similar disassociation from society. After all, religious television is often evangelical or
conservative in its theology. This disassociation also stems from many fundamentalist and
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evangelical Christians subscribing to a theological outlook known as premillennialism. This
belief holds that the world must deteriorate into sinfulness until an Anti-Christ takes power over
the Earth, whereupon Christ will return to Earth as king. Christ will then summon the faithful in
what is known as the Rapture. A millennium of tribulations will then ravage the world before
Christ will return to vanquish the Anti-Christ (Wilcox 2000). Wilcox goes on to explain the
impact this worldview has on political efficacy:
“If…the world must inevitably worsen until Christ rescues his followers, then politics is a
futile endeavor. Moreover, if Christ might come again at any moment and summon the pure to
him, then the top priority for Christian must be to remain distinct from the sinful world to avoid
temptation. Political involvement might lead to compromise with sin, which would leave the
Christian unready for the trumpet call that would signal the second coming. The fundamentalist
acceptance of premillennialism therefore created a strong resistance to political involvement…”
(27)
This resultant disassociation from political affairs can lead to a disinterest and mistrust in
the operations of the nation’s political institutions and decreased political efficacy (Scheufele,
Nisbet and Brossard 2003).
However, the electronic church, in keeping with its revivalist roots, is often overtly
political (Abelman and Neyendorf 1987; Hadden 1987). Issues of the day may be discussed in
the context of sermons held up as examples of America’s sinfulness or presented in formats
similar to the evening news (Abelman 1987; Straub 1988). It is proposed in this dissertation that
consumers of religious television are particularly susceptible to having their political outlooks
and opinions molded. By presenting political messages in a format or context that is more
attractive and salient to the viewer than a typical news broadcast, religious television can
influence an audience that might otherwise ignore traditional political coverage. Importantly, this
religious information is being disseminated, not from the pulpit, but from the television. Keeping
in mind McLuhan’s observation that “the medium is the message” (1964), it should be expected
that a televised religious broadcast would have an effect upon the audience distinct from that of a
8

live religious sermon. This expectation ties in with extant literature’s explorations into the unique
impact of television itself (Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; McLuhan 1964; Mutz and
Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976). The present work builds upon previous scholarship in the
videomalaise school by suggesting that religious television has a confrontational component that
is partially a product of the nature of the medium itself, and partially a product of the content of
the messages being delivered by the television preachers.
It is expected that consumers of religious media have a more exclusionary, conservative
worldview than other segments of society with respect to certain out-groups. Academic work
that has performed content analysis of religious television has not been conducted in over two
decades. While the following information may be considered outdated, the most popular
televangelists of the late 1980s, including Jimmy Swaggert, Jim Bakker and Pat Robertson,
devoted the largest sections of their time to covering political or social issues, as opposed to
strictly religious issues (Abelman and Neuendorf 1987). It also bears mentioning that the trend
was one where the blocks of time on their programs devoted to social or political issues, as
opposed to religious issues, were on the increase as Abelman and Neuendorf’s period of analysis
concluded. In terms of distinct content on television, as opposed to coming from the pulpit,
Abelman and Neuendorf (1987) also note the praise that televangelists had for the medium of
television and the mass media itself:
“One of the most interesting findings, given the fact that mass media are common targets
of political and social leaders, was that mass media were one of the few topics readily approved
of by discussants in these programs. It is possible, however, that this is not necessarily a view
generally held in religious circles, but rather an artifact of the media-dependence of electronic
ministries” (164).
Televangelists thus seem to readily support the marriage between the old revival culture
and the new method of delivering the message.
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Satirical Media: An Overview
While political satire is hardly a new phenomenon, political science literature has
remained mostly silent on the subject until recently. Even as studies examined the impact of the
medium of television on the political views, efficacy, and behavior of the American populace,
few political scientists took notice of satirical programming such as Saturday Night Live and its
“Weekend Update” segment or the anti-establishment ethos behind The Smothers Brothers (Carr
1992). However, the popularity of the Comedy Central program, The Daily Show, among
younger, more affluent, and college-educated Americans has helped spearhead a rediscovery of
academic interest in political satire’s potential to shape the views and behavior of its audience.
Late-night comedy shows tend to devote significant time and attention to political commentary,
which has sparked interest of late within the political communication literature to satirical media
(Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Fox et al. 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; LaMarre et al. 2009;
Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010; Moy et al. 2005, 2006; Young 2004; Young and
Tisinger 2006). This rediscovery of satirical media has not been wholly confined to the leftleaning The Daily Show. Studies on late night talk shows in general also have begun to appear in
academic journals, often providing some illuminating findings (Moy, Xenos and Hess 2005;
Parkin 2010) Additionally, recent works demonstrate how younger Americans seem to learn
substantive political issues better through comedic programming than through “straight news”
programming (Parkin 2010). The ability of comedic programs to inform, as well as entertain,
lends further credence to Zaller’s Receive-Accept-Sample (R-A-S) model. The R-A-S model
proposes that viewers’ level of engagement is determinative of whether or not they will
“receive,” or be able to understand and retain, a given message. If that message is able to fit in
with the viewers’ previously held opinions or outlooks, they are likely to “accept” the message.
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When then asked their opinion about an issue, viewers will “sample” the opinions that have most
recently been “received” and “accepted.” By tuning in to a program that seems relevant to their
interests, such as the comedic Late Night with David Letterman, younger viewers are not only
receptive to what is being broadcast but likely to accept and store the messages that they are
receiving (Zaller 1992).
Countering the prior convention that candidate appearances on entertainment programs
would lead viewers to focus on superficial issues, Parkin (2010) was found that viewers of late
night comedy programs could actually “become cognizant and knowledgeable of key issues in
the campaign” (4), and, it was found that many viewers learn more about substantive political
issues through this “entertaining medium” rather than through “straight news.” As Parkin (2010)
concludes, “the entertaining aspects of unconventional news sources can have a real impact on
what people know about politics and how they make their decisions” (13). This finding was
particularly true among younger Americans. For younger viewers, the “entertaining context” of
John Kerry’s appearance on David Letterman, even presented as a transcript rather than a video
clip, caused increased interest toward substantive political issues (Parkin 2010).
This rediscovery of satirical television may stem from the generational divide in the
consumption of, and trust in, satirical television. Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre (2010) make
note of the results of a 2008 Pew Research Center survey wherein 27 percent of respondents
aged eighteen-to-twenty-nine reported “sometimes” learning about the 2008 presidential
campaign from comedy shows. By way of comparison, only 14 percent of respondents over fifty
reported in kind (Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010). This study was not unique in
demonstrating the influence that satirical and humorous broadcasts can have on young
Americans (Cao 2008; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Hollander 2005). As Carr (1992) proposes,
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satirical media also often presents distinct in-group/out-group divides, wherein select out-groups
are targets for mocking and ridicule.

Expectations
How do these forms of television affect the viewing public? The central assertion of this
study is that exposure to non-news sources can influence the views and attitudes of the viewer.
The present study will focus specifically on the theory that exposure to non-news sources leads
the viewer to hold negative attitudes toward the out-groups targeted by that non-news source. In
order to test this assertion, I will utilize both analysis of pre-existing datasets and an
experimental design. In the experimental design, subjects will be exposed to religious television
and satirical television. It is expected that exposure to these visual materials will lead viewers to
hold stronger antipathy towards the out-groups mentioned in the visual materials when compared
with the attitudes towards those same groups among those not exposed to the visual materials. It
is also expected that this antipathy will remain statistically significant even when controls for
political ideology, partisanship, and relevant socio-demographic characteristics are included in
the model. The following table outlines the predicted results of the project’s experimental design
component. It is anticipated that exposure to the two forms of non-news will be correlated with
stronger negative feelings toward the out-groups targeted in those clips. Due to the divisive,
negative, conflict-laden nature of television broadcasts, it is not expected that exposure to visual
materials will lead to increased positive attitudes towards the corresponding in-group for either
religious media or satirical media. Representing Parkin (2010)’s “straight news,” a local news
broadcast will be used as the control treatment.
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Table 1.1 Expected Results

Visual Materials to which

Respondents’ Attitudes Towards Targeted Out-Groups

Respondents are Exposed
Feelings Towards Left-

Feelings Towards Right-

Leaning Groups/Individuals

Leaning Groups/Individuals

Religious Media

More Hostile

No Change

Satirical Media

No Change

More Hostile

Local News

No Change

No Change

Data and Methods
Survey data from General Social Surveys (GSS) and Annenberg will be used in the
statistical analysis in Chapter 4. The survey data contains questions pertaining to watching both
satirical television (Annenberg) and religious television (GSS). Each of the surveys also asks
questions needed to establish controls, such as questions regarding partisanship, and sociodemographic questions. In addition to the GSS and Annenberg survey data, this research project
will utilize an experimental design. Previous works in the field have discussed the drawbacks
associated with using only cross-sectional data in attempting to measure media effects such as
agenda setting (Behr and Iyengar 1985; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Ladd 2009). The use of
an experimental design addresses the shortcomings that are inherent in the use of any survey
data, particularly when using survey data to try to measure media effects. By complementing the
results of survey data with an experimental design, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, this
dissertation addresses the potential for self-selection among the respondents biasing the results.
Similarly, the cross-sectional data statistical analysis supporting the results of the experimental
13

design shows the validity and robustness of the results in the field and outside a controlled
experimental setting.
The potential for self-selection by audience members is a concern in media effects
research. It is possible that there is simply a unique subset of religious Americans, who resemble
other religious Americans, but who hold particularly hostile opinions towards certain societal
out-groups. These religious Americans would gravitate toward religious programming that
reflects their worldview. The potential for self-selection biasing the results of any analysis would
also call into question the direction of the causal arrow of this study. That is, the network
executives and the creative forces responsible for the content of television programs may modify
their product based on what they feel the audience wants to hear (Behr and Iyengar 1985). One
could argue that that religious media does not affect its audience, but that a core religious
constituency wants to hear messages that reflect their political viewpoints and so they tune in to
programming that they feel accurately reflects their values. Producers of religious programming
would then try to make sure that their programming accurately captures the values of their
audience. Similarly, it is possible that those drawn to late-night comedy programs such as The
Daily Show already have little respect for conservative public figures. The late-night comedy
programs could thus tailor their messages in order to appeal to the political sensibilities and
cynical opinions of this subset of the American public.
While this dissertation acknowledge that networks will air programs that they feel will
attract viewers, this does not mean that the programs do not still have an impact in shaping the
views and attitudes of their audiences. Behr and Iyengar (1985) demonstrate that news coverage
is mostly unaffected by public opinion; further, they found no empirical support for the position
that public sentiment influences media messages in general. However, the same study was able
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to find substantial empirical evidence to support the claim that television news can, and does,
influence the viewing public. More recent literature has acknowledged that, while television may
use conflict or negativity as a kind of bait to attract the audience, media does have a real impact
upon the viewing audience (Forgette and Morris 2006).
Outline and Conclusion
The second chapter of the dissertation provides the literature review and theory sections.
An overview of literature regarding media effects precedes a more detailed looks at the two case
studies for this dissertation: religious television and satirical television. The third chapter details
the experimental design used to test the effect of being exposed to non-news. The fourth chapter
analyzes large national datasets for the impact that non-news television can have on views
towards targeted out-groups. The fifth chapter summarizes the results presented in the previous
two chapters and then presents extensions of this research as well as the normative implications
of its findings.
This dissertation addresses many questions currently unexplored in existing media effects
literature. Non-news television programs fostering of out-group hostility warrants empirical
examination, and this dissertation makes a significant contribution to the field by addressing this
topic in a novel manner. This dissertation is in the vanguard of using new technology to explore
media effects by utilizing an experimental design with respondents recruited via the new
MechanicalTurk service offered by Amazon.com and hosted by Qualtrics.com.
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CHAPTER II: THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW

This work examines the impact that non-news--media that may not be billed or presented
as being a source of political information that nonetheless contains political messages--has on the
attitudes and beliefs of its consumers. Using the case studies of religious television and satirical
television, this dissertation demonstrates through the analysis of survey data and the use of an
experimental design that non-news television shapes the views and attitudes of its audience. This
research was conducted with the a priori assumption that media can and does shape the opinions
of television viewers and other consumers of mass media. However, political scientists have not
always agreed.
There has been some debate in the field of political communications regarding just how
much of an influence media has. The dominant view in the literature--up until the tail end of the
Twentieth Century--was previously the minimal effects theory, which holds that media has little
influence in shaping the beliefs or attitudes of the audience (Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955;
McCombs and Shaw 1972; McGuire 1985; Neuman 1986). In describing--and ultimately
refuting--the minimal effects theory, Bennet and Iyengar (2008) explain how minimal effects
theory proposes that the media’s impact is diluted after being passed through a psychological
filter created by each individual’s social networks, including “political parties, churches, unions
and service organizations” (Bennett and Iyengar 2008; 707). Minimal effects theory has also
been successfully countered by work demonstrating that media can and does have a real impact
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on the views and behavior of those who consume media messages (Bartels 1993; Entman 1989;
Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Iyengar and Simon 2000).
Prior works in the field explore the question of media effects in several ways. Some
political scientists have looked at the impact of direct attempts to influence the American public.
For example, scholars have examined the impact that campaign commercials, negative ads, and
other media appeals from political campaigns have on the electorate (Goldstein and Freedman
2002; Freedman and Goldstein 1999; Niven 2006; Wattenberg and Brians 1999). Other works
have sought a more generalizable approach by looking at how different forms of media can have
varying degrees of impact on their audience or simply looking to see whether or not media
messages impact the audience at all (Ebring, Goldenberg and Miller 1980; Price and Zaller 1993;
Stroud 2008).
Another debate that circles the media effects literature is whether or not the selective
reception of media messages impacts the general public. Some have proposed that, since the
viewing audience self-selects messages with which they already agree, the media ultimately
plays a small role in influencing the viewing public. Zaller (1992) and Gerbner et al. (1984)
argue that the self-selection of media messages is inconsequential when it comes to television’s
impact on the views and attitudes of the viewing public. Zaller (1992) and Gerbner et al. (1984)
argue that the relatively similar messages being disseminated from all television channels cause
watching television to have a homogenizing influence on viewers. “Mainstreaming theory” holds
that those who watch the most television, even from varied socio-demographic and geographic
backgrounds, will have more similar views and outlooks than infrequent viewers from differing
socio-demographic and geographic backgrounds (Gerbner et al. 1984). Similarly, Zaller (1992)
argues that while people inform themselves by exposure to a wide variety of outlets, most of
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these outlets carry similar messages and form a national mainstream opinion on a variety of
issues. These two findings are similar to those of Mutz (1992) who argues that political coverage
can serve to homogenize opinions in the United States. By constantly reporting the “horse race”
and pegging certain candidates or issues as “winners” or “losers,” television coverage influences
how Americans perceive those candidates or issues (Mutz 1992). This, too, may be seen as a
form of “mainstreaming” opinion. However, even proponents of mainstreaming theory
acknowledge that there may, in fact, be two distinct “mainstreams” being created by television
viewership: a “general” mainstream and a “religious” mainstream (Gerbner et al. 1984). Litman
and Bain (1989), sounding prescient in light of the present niche-oriented media environment,
went a step further and suggested that religious television is a form of “narrowcasting,” or
targeting a very specific message to a very specific audience. The question of who watches
religious television will be discussed in more depth later in this dissertation.
Television presents a far more diverse array of programming options now than it did
twenty or thirty years ago. Today, channels that did not exist when Gerbner et al. completed their
work in 1984, (or Zaller his in 1992), compete for distinct blocks of the television viewing
public, a phenomenon that did not occur in the era of three national television networks. With the
concurrent rise of the internet during the growth of cable and satellite television, the nature of the
mass media has changed greatly since 1992 (DiMaggio et al. 2001; Xenos and Moy 2007).
Information Processing and Media Effects
The analysis of media effects in Entman (1989) warrants consideration. Entman discusses
the information processing approach and the "interdependence model.” Rather than assessing
whether new information presented to individuals is congruent with their previously held beliefs,
the information processing approach argues that salience is the key factor in determining whether

18

the individuals then processes that information in their pre-established schema systems.
"Processing may lead the person to either store the information or discard; if stored, the
information may stimulate new beliefs or change old beliefs" (Entman 1989; 350). This is not
wholly dissimilar from Zaller’s R-A-S model of information reception (1992). Entman and
Zaller’s findings help highlight the relevance of non-news to the field of political science.
Viewers of non-news broadcasting receive and process the political messages concealed within
satirical or religious programming as it is being presented to them in an attractive, or salient,
package. A viewer who distrusts politicians or who is disinterested in politics may disregard a
political advertisement or a speech by a politician. The same viewer could have his or her beliefs
and opinions molded by non-news precisely because the political manipulation is subtle and the
political information is presented as comedic or spiritual discourse.
The on line model of information processing offers another reason for political scientists
to take interest in the potential power of non-news sources of information. The on line model
finds that people do not necessarily store exact facts and figures relating to every person, place or
thing about which they have an opinion. Rather, people retain a kind of internal “running tally”
of positive and negative emotions, even while they may quickly discard the information that
caused them to develop a positive or negative impression of the concept in question (Lodge,
McGraw and Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990).
For example, viewers may not necessarily remember that their impression of a given politician
came from a comedian mocking them for their hypocrisy or a preacher chastising their
immorality, but they will retain a negative impression of that particular politician. This is in
keeping with literature that has discussed the importance of affect in the formulation of
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preferences and in the decision-making processes (Damasio 2003; Gunnell 2007; Marcus,
Newman and Mackuen 2000; Mutz 2007; Zajonc 1980: 1984).
The ability to make viewers feel, rather than think, may be the more powerful skill in
influencing an audience. In particular, clinical and theoretical work alike has stressed the
importance that negative emotional reactions have in influencing how people determine the
importance of particular issues (Carter, Stamm and Heintz-Knowles 1992; McCombs 1999;
Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Martin 2008; Miller 2007; Zajonc 1980). The findings
from clinical research align with the present work’s central theory: the attitudes and views of
those who consume non-news are influenced by the negative depiction of out-groups within nonnews.
Religious Media and Satirical Media
The two forms of broadcasts to be explored in depth in this work are religious and
satirical television. Both satirical and religious broadcasts have long been staples of television,
and both satirical and religious broadcasts are very popular.2 Satirical and religious broadcasts
each have each been given a measure of academic analysis in political science, and both satirical
and religious television may present political messages to viewers, albeit in the guise of
humorous or spiritually uplifting television. Both religious and satirical media target out-groups
for scorn or condemnation within their broadcasts (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Bruce 1990;
Hughey 1990; Jamieson and Waldman 2003; Straub 1988). In light of these facts, both religious
and satirical television programming deserve further empirical scrutiny: just what effect does
2

Conservative estimates of viewership of religious television place the number around 15-20
million viewers per week (Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover 1987). Between two to four million
Americans in a given night watch The Tonight Show with Jay Leno or Late Night with David
Letterman, and about 1.5 million viewers watch The Daily Show at 11 PM. Given that Stewart is
re-broadcast several times throughout the day, the total number of viewers is likely higher
(Konodolojy 2013).
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viewing either religious or satirical television have upon the viewing audience? The unique
history and role of both religious and satirical television will be discussed distinctly, as shall the
unique features of their consumers. While satirical and religious media will each have a different
impact on the viewing audience, the reasons for the effect of each overlap. As such, the theory
and hypothesis sections of this chapter shall discuss both forms of media. Before addressing the
research questions of this dissertation questions directly, the reader will be provided with a brief
history of religious television in the United States, followed by an overview of how satirical
media has been studied by the academy. This will allow for the research questions offered by this
dissertation to be placed in proper context
It is understood that there are other sources of religious media than simply television.
Religious radio broadcasts were the basis of the electronic church, and remain highly popular to
this day. Similarly, comedic online podcasts draw numerous fans, and online forms of social
media such as Twitter have given birth to entirely new forms of comedy, such as the creation of
satirical fake Twitter accounts. These include both parody accounts purportedly held by public
figures (Edwin Edwards, Bill Clinton, Rahm Emmanuel) or entirely fake personages holding
accounts that satirize modern life (Karl Welzein). However, the present work will focus strictly
on television, rather than radio or broadcasts available on the internet. There are qualities unique
to television that would lead to media effects distinct from those of the internet, radio or print
media (Forgette and Morris 2006; McLuhan 1964; Mutz 2007; Robinson 1975; Robinson 1976.)
Additionally, there is admittedly scant data currently available concerning, for example religious
radio or satirical internet broadcasts. Data on these forms of media would have proven especially
useful when attempting to demonstrate the singular nature of television media effects
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Religious Television: Background and Context
One of the most distinct features of American culture is the value placed upon two
seemingly incongruous social phenomena: religion, particularly Christianity (Wilcox 2000)3, and
electronic media, particularly television. Living in the birthplace of television, Americans
continue to watch more television than any other nation in the world (Gilson 2009). Among
Western nations, America is unique in that prosperity and modernity has not led to an increase in
postmaterial thought and a subsequent abandoning of formal religion (Andersen and Fetner
2008; Clark 2010; Eckstein 1988; Inglehart 1997). In light of America’s continued love of the
electronic media and of religion, it seems fitting that the first merger of religion and the
electronic media occurred in the United States.
The first regular religious broadcasting in the world began on January 2nd, 1921 when the
Cavalry Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania began transmitting services on the AM
station KDKA (Stacey and Shupe 1982). This is the “mustard seed” which grew into the multimillion dollar4 multimedia phenomenon of religious broadcasting, dubbed by critics and

3

While Americans remain predominantly Christian, they still tend to hold those who hold some
kind of religious beliefs in higher regard than those who are atheists. See Robinson 2011where a
Gallup poll from 2007 shows only 45% of Americans would vote for an “otherwise qualified”
member of their political party who was an atheist for President of the United States. By way of
comparison, 55% would vote for an “otherwise qualified” homosexual who was a member of
their political party, and 72% would vote for an “otherwise qualified” Mormon member of their
political party. Findings such as these make it appear safe to say that, while it is debatable
whether or not America is a “Christian Nation,” it is certainly a “Religious Nation”. See Also
Wilcox 2000
4
During the hey-day of televangelism in the early to mid 1980s, media expenditures for the top
televangelists included $106,000,000 by Jimmy Swaggart, $100,000,000 by Jerry Falwell,
$66,000,000 for Jim Bakker and $60,000,000 for Oral Roberts. Crushing the competition with
his media empire was Pat Robertson, who spent $233,000,000 in 1985. It should be noted that,
these being among the more successful of the television preachers, their intake likely greatly
exceeded their expenditures. The fact that Pat Robertson was spending nearly a quarter of a
billion dollars in 1985 on his media empire must be stressed. In 2012 dollars, that means Pat
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followers alike as, “The Electronic Church.” Academic works on the nature of religious media in
the United States have been published, such as histories of religious media (Goff 1999; Lazerson
1985), biographies of televangelists such as Oral Roberts (Harrell 1985) or case studies regarding
the 1988 Presidential run by Pat Robertson (Green and Guth 1988; Harrell 1987; Hertzke 1993).
However, there are few empirical academic explorations into the nature of the effects of
consuming religious media. This work hopes to address that gap in the literature by addressing
the media effects associated with the consumption of religious television and satirical television,
respectively.
History of The Electronic Church
After the Civil War, America experienced a great period of growth and migration.
Immigrants from Europe came to America in unprecedented numbers. Populations boomed, not
only in established urban centers, but also along the Western frontier. The religious revival of the
late 1800s and early 1900s, including the Second Great Awakening in the West, was a response
to this sudden change in American society. During this time period, non-Protestants arrived from
overseas, and immigrants and native-born Americans alike were moving to unchurched, untamed
lands in America’s West (Hadden 1987). Hadden (1987) proffers the theory that this upswing in
religiosity was not just the case of requiring more preachers and churches to tend to the needs of
a mobile and rapidly growing population; the revival was a reaction to the new “uncivilized”
character of America, including the relatively new phenomenon of urban poverty in the United
States. These charismatic5 preachers, and the adherents to their messages, believed that their new

Robertson was spending about $525,000,000 in a single year on his television ministry, an
extraordinary amount of money! (Elvy 1987; Mickelthwait and Wooldridge 2009)
5
When the word “charismatic” is used in this work, it is not being used in the secular sense, as in
“possessing an extraordinary ability to attract,” but in the religious sense, meaning, “a form of
Christianity that emphasizes the Holy Spirit.”
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strain of Christianity offered both personal salvation to those who accepted the message of Jesus,
and cures for the societal ills that were ailing the nation (Hadden 1987).
The revivalist preachers differed from the denominational structure of American
Protestantism that had heretofore dominated the American religious landscape. These preachers,
and those who assisted them in staging revivals and evangelistic crusades, were independent and
autonomous from the denominational churches that already existed in the United States, but
“crossed sectarian boundaries and drew their support from Christians who belonged to a wide
variety of churches” (Hadden and Shupe 1988). Hadden and Shupe (1988) describe these
organizational structures as parachurches. The independent, autonomous, yet cross-sectional
nature of these parachurches is of particular importance as it “provide(s), in both form and
content, the organizational model of the contemporary electronic church” (Hadden 1987; 9). Like
the revivalist of the late 19th and early 20th century, the modern day televangelist is free from any
denominational constraints, and draws audiences that reach across ecumenical boundaries
(Harrell 1985). This freedom also means that the modern day televangelist is responsible for
staging the entire “production” on his own. Paying for space, a choir, and the preacher’s own
salary and lifestyle, are the duties of the preacher; there is no governing body to make sure bills
are paid. This means direct solicitations from the preacher’s audience are required for the
continued operations of the preacher’s ministry (Abelman 1987a, Hughey 1990).6 It is perhaps
not surprising, then, that the greatest pioneer in the use of the relatively new medium of
television to grow his ministry was also one of the last great “old time” tent revivalists in the
United States, Oral Roberts (Harrell 1985).

6

For an example of a transitional figure in the rise of the electronic church, juggling missionary
duties as well as maintaining ratings See Goff (1999)
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The similarities between the revivalist preacher of the Second Great Awakening and the
modern televangelist do not stop at how their ministries were organized. In terms of both
structure and theology, there are strong links between the revivalist movement of the early 20th
century and the electronic church of today. Like the modern televangelist, the revivalist of the
late 19th century and early 20th century was preaching a conservative brand of Christianity,
sometimes charismatic or Pentecostal, sometimes fundamentalist.7 The next key link between the
revivalists and the televangelists is the fact that evangelicals and fundamentalists, theological
descendants of those who traveled the countryside and built massive audiences during the
revivalist period via parachurches rather than through the existing denominational structures in
place in the United States, eventually took over the religious airwaves.
The Communications Act of 1934 allowed for the FCC to grant licenses to stations.
While never specifying the details of the arrangement, it was understood that stations were
required to offer some of their airtime to “public interest” programming, which included
religious programming. Both national and local networks gave this airtime, free of charge, to

7

It is not possible to do justice to the theological distinctions between charismatics and
Pentecostals, fundamentalists and evangelicals in the confines of this work without embarking
upon a lengthy digression. While not essential for the understanding of the remainder of the
work, the reader may want some insight as to what these words mean, as the terms will be used
repeatedly. Pentecostals and charismatics believe in the importance of “spiritual gifts” being
bestowed upon believers by the Holy Spirit, such as “glossolalia, prophecy, miracles and faith
healing”. Fundamentalists take a more conservative approach, generally, and believe in the
inerrancy of the Bible. Evangelicals stress the necessity for being “born again” into Jesus Christ,
and like fundamentalists, see the Bible as the “the only trustworthy guide in moral and spiritual
matters” and tend to see themselves at odds with the rest of society. Generally speaking,
however, evangelicals tend to be more tolerant of those from different Christian backgrounds,
such as Pentecostals, than do fundamentalists. Each of these groups has played a distinct role in
the rise of the electronic church, and for reference the reader may want to think of men like Oral
Roberts as examples of a Pentecostal figure, whereas Jerry Falwell would be representative of
the fundamentalist movement. For a more detailed overview of these groups and their impact in
American Politics, See Wilcox 2000; 25-30, Hertzke (1993), Campbell (2006), Green and Guth
(1988), Harrell (1987), Smidt, (1988)
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mainline religious groups (Hadden and Shupe 1988). In 1960, however, the FCC issued a
directive stating that there was no requirement that “public interest” airtime be given away for
free by the stations; networks could sell the airtime to, for example, religious groups, and still be
serving the “public interest” as far as the FCC was concerned. The stations made the logical
decision to stop giving away for free that which could be sold; after the FCC decree, ninety-two
percent of all religious broadcasting in the United States became paid-time broadcasting (Hadden
1987). This shift caused the mainline churches, unwilling or unable to compete commercially, to
lose their airtime to the evangelical and fundamental preachers for whom “the confluence of
evangelical proselytizing zeal and the commercial fee-enterprise system go together well”
(Hadden 1987; 16).8 The formation of the National Religious Broadcasters (NRB) in 1944 also
played a large role in allowing evangelicals to dominate the religious airwaves.
Founded by 150 evangelical broadcasters in Columbus, Ohio, the NRB quickly
established powerful connections in Washington, DC, that have worked to represent the interests
of non-denominational, evangelical broadcasters (Hadden and Shupe 1988). One of the major
accomplishments of the NRB was ensuring that “public interest” air time could be purchased on
the open market, rather than simply being set aside for mainline Protestant groups. Coming from
a tradition where each preacher is individually responsible for their own ministry, the
televangelist is thus able to continue in the revivalist model with minimum modifications.
Who Uses The Electronic Church?
There are demographic characteristics of the users of religious broadcasting that do set
them apart from Americans as a whole. They tend to be older, lower income, less educated, more
likely to be “blue collar” and more likely to be female. Additionally, and unsurprisingly, people
8

See Also Hughey (1990) and his discussion of the relationship between Protestantism and the
free market capitalist system dating back to Weber.
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who watch religious broadcasting tend to be more religious than the average American.
Specifically, they are more likely to be church members, to participate in other religious
activities, to be Protestant and evangelical and conservative in religious and social outlooks
(Abelman 1987a; 199-200; Litman and Bain 1989). Additional studies have also shown that:
•

Women are more likely to watch or listen to religious broadcasts than men;

•

Non-whites moderately more likely to listen or view than whites;

•

Viewers are more likely to live in rural areas than cities;

•

And viewers are more likely to live in the South than the Northeast (Gerbner et
al. 1984; Hoover 1987; Pettersson 1986)9.

Complimenting these studies are more recent works demonstrating that, among AfricanAmericans, rural African-Americans in the South are more likely to watch religious
programming than other African-Americans (Park and Baker 2007; Sherkat and Cunningham
1998).
Satirical Media: Context and Background
In addition to exploring the impact that religious television has upon its audience’s views
and outlooks, this work also looks to explore the impact that satirical television programs can
have upon the audience’s views and outlooks. Specifically, this dissertation empirically tests the
concept that satirical media, by holding up certain targets for ridicule or scorn, does more than
provide laughs for its audience. It is hypothesized that satirical media can and does influence the
views of the audience as to those groups or persons made into the butts of the comedy. The
divisive nature of television does little to bring groups together, but serves to cause greater
9

Pettersson’s study examined Swedish consumers of religious media and found that, again,
“…frequent TV service viewers are predominantly older, less educated, female, and “rural”.
They also score higher on such measures of religiosity as private prayer, Bible reading and
identifying oneself as a “confessing Christian” or “religious person”.” Pettersson, pg. 395
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feelings of antipathy towards the “out-groups” targeted to be the objects of ridicule in televised
satires (Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005 Robinson
1975). This work does not hypothesize that satirical media makes one more likely to support
Democratic or liberal candidates or causes, but that satirical media does cause viewers to be
more hostile to Republican or conservative candidates or groups. To begin with first principles,
this chapter will begin with a definition and a distinction. Some clarification may be needed in
explaining what is meant by the term, “satirical” television programming, as opposed to simply
“comedic” television programming.
The creator of the long-running animated sitcom The Simpsons, Matt Groening, described
the theme running through the series as, “the people in power don’t always have your best
interests in mind” (Cantor 1999; 745). Indeed, a strain of anti-establishment thought seems to be
present in all forms of satire, be it televised late night talk shows, humor magazines such as
“MAD” or even in satire packaged as something as innocuous as a sitcom. Thompson (2009)
provides a strong definition of satire while expressing the idea of “sitcom satire.” Looking
specifically at the popular animated series The King of the Hill, Thompson (2009) states: “Most
simply, to satirize is to scrutinize, which requires an object to study and, ultimately, to
ridicule…Satire, then, means laughing ‘at’ someone whose behavior or beliefs deserve ridicule.
The question is, who does the audience understand that someone to be?” (Thompson 2009; 4041). Thompson (2009) not only provides this project with a working definition of satire, but also
raises a question that this dissertation will explore. Who is being ridiculed in these televised
satires, and how does this ridicule affect the audience? It is argued in this dissertation that while
viewers may be tuning in for laughs, they are getting more than a welcome dose of humor; they
also are having their views and attitudes shaped by the satirical programs they view.
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Who Uses Satirical Media?
Who is the audience for satirical media, and why do they watch? There is scant empirical
information regarding the audience for satire, generally. However, there have been several
studies of individual satirical programs that generally indicate the audience for this form of
entertainment tends to be younger, better educated and more likely to live in an urban area than
the typical television viewer. The recent spate of research into The Daily Show stresses that Jon
Stewart’s audience is young, “hip” and college educated, thus making them the sort of
demographic that academics, policy makers and advertisers find fascinating (Baumgartner and
Morris 2006; Cao 2008; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert et al. 2007;
Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). However, even academic
articles that discuss older satirical programming discuss how the target audience for the antiestablishment form of entertainment fits this same mold.
Cantor (1999) discussed how The Simpsons influences the way Americans think,
“particularly the younger generation” (Cantor 1999; 734). Carr (1992) discusses the clashes
between CBS and the comedic duo The Smothers Brothers regarding the political content of the
program The Smothers Brothers Comedy Hour, culminating in the network’s decision to cancel
the program in 1969. In doing so, Carr (1992) describes how the satirical program’s appeal with
younger, more urban viewers “created a kind of us versus them rhetoric” (Carr 1992; 13).
Similarly, there has been a spate of research in the field recently demonstrating that, while
younger viewers may not necessarily watch more satirical media, they do seem to be more
affected by it (Cao 2008; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Hollander 2005; Landreville, Holbert and
LaMarre 2010; Parkin 2010; Young and Tisinger 2006). It has been argued that part of the
reason for the success of programs such as The Daily Show in reaching younger audiences is the
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fact that satire, while demanding and fostering skepticism from its audience, also holds out an
ultimate promise that things can get better. "Though humor in art is less likely to elicit profound
understanding of propaganda, it has an immediate appeal and more direct political consequences
than pessimism” (Edelman 1988; 128 Young and Esralew 2011; 5). However, recent studies
have demonstrated that viewers of The Daily Show report not only higher levels of confidence in
their own abilities to understand the political landscape, they also report stronger negative
feelings towards political candidates, a wide spectrum of political institutions and the news
media generally (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Further investigation into whether satirical
media fosters cynicism and negative views towards select out-groups is thus warranted.
Baum (2005) broached the idea of viewers receiving political information from non-news
sources including entertainment-focused talk shows, or “E-Talk shows.” Keeping with the
theory underpinning this work, Baum (2005) found that these ostensibly apolitical programs
could and did still have an impact on how viewers felt about political figures. In a marked
contrast from this work, Baum (2005) showed how E-Talk shows actually increased positive
feelings towards political figures from viewers of the opposite party. At first blush, those
findings may call into question “videomalaise” theory and its progeny, including the present
work. A closer examination of Baum (2005) reveals some marked differences between that work
and this dissertation. Baum (2005) concludes that E-Talk shows cause low-information voters to
become more likely to cross party lines in order to support a candidate who appeared on an ETalk show, as E-Talk show appearances humanize guests. This would seem to run against the
distorting, confrontational aspect of television that is central to this analysis. However, when we
look at how Baum (2005) analyzed respondents when looking for the effect of consuming E-Talk
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Shows, we see that late night comedies have been excluded from consideration.10 Despite
mentioning candidates appearing on late night talk shows such as The Tonight Show with Jay
Leno or Late Night with David Letterman in the introduction to his work, and despite examining
the content of these two programs (as well as four daytime talk shows, The Oprah Winfrey Show,
The Rosie O’Donnell Show, Live! With Regis and Kathy Lee and The Queen Latifah Show) in
order to contrast E-Talk shows with “hard news” Baum’s analysis vis a vis the impact of
consuming “E-Talk Shows” is concerned only with candidate appearances on daytime television
talk shows “such as Oprah Winfrey, Rosie O’Donnell or Jerry Springer” (Baum 2005; 219).
A further contrast between this work and Baum (2005) is the fact that Baum’s work is
focused around those instances where a political figure (such as a candidate for President of the
United States) appears on a daytime talk show. It stands to reason that a regular viewer of
daytime television may consider the rare occasion that a presidential candidate appears on the
program to mark this a “very special episode,” and they will tune in and seek out political
information. This does not exenterate the central theory of this dissertation; rather this work and
Baum’s can co-exist quite easily. Simply because there are those “must see television events”
where a political figure may appear on a program, and viewers specifically tune in to learn
something about the issues or the figure, does not mean that viewers cannot also watch their
regular nightly line-up of favorite programs, not expecting to encounter political messages, and
nonetheless have their views altered by the programs they have watched.
In discussing his conclusion, the reader must also consider the fact that Baum (2005),
despite mentioning satirical programs such as David Letterman’s in the body of his work and

10

In fairness to Baum, he was working with the data that available to him via the 2000 ANES.
Questions regarding watching late night comedic talk shows were not asked in this particular
panel.
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despite analyzing the content of The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Late Night with David
Letterman, does not consider in his model how often viewers watched these (or any other) late
night talk shows. In short, Baum (2005) proffers his theory that low-information voters will gain
a more favorable view of candidates due to their appearances on E-Talk shows without including
satirical or comedic programs in his definition of “E-Talk Show”11; Baum only includes nonsatirical and non-comedic daytime television talk shows in his model. The failure to include
satirical late night talks shows distinguishes Baum’s article from this dissertation. Just as talk
shows do not have to be satirical, though, satirical programs are not limited to the talk show
format.
Thompson (2009) also makes an intriguing case that satire can come in unconventional
forms. Critical theorists both within and outside the field of political science have argued that
television sitcoms--long thought banal escapism and cavalcade of mediocrity--have a substantive
impact on the audience’s political views and attitudes (Goldman 1982; Rabinovitz 1989). While
this concept is somewhat outside the scope of this project, continued explorations in the vein of
the present work would seek to empirically test the idea that television sitcoms indeed have
“fairly elaborate, though often unarticulated, political-ideological foundations” (Feldman and
Sigelman 1985) that influence the opinions and behavior of the prime-time audience. This is
again, not a new phenomenon, as Carr (1992; 3) notes that programs such as All in the Family in
the early 1970s “pushed the boundaries of controversy and relevance…” A handful of scholars
outside the discipline of political science have empirically tested the impact that sitcoms can
have on their audience.

11

Though it is debatable as to whether The Jerry Springer Show was actually intended as a
highly crude satire of the popular daytime television talk show format.
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The sitcom Will and Grace, notable for prominently featuring homosexual characters,
was the subject of studies into how audiences responded to its characterizations of the more
subdued gay character Will, as well as the more flamboyant character Jack (Cooper 2003).
However, Cooper (2003) only intimated at the broader implications of his study. Work could be
done to explore how the audiences’ fondness for both Jack and Will could impact their views on
gay rights.
What Does It All Mean?
The central argument of this dissertation is that non-news broadcasts influence the
attitudes and opinions of those viewers. In light of television’s propensity to highlight conflict
and present a hostile view of the world to its viewers (Forgette and Morris 2006; Mutz and
Reeves 2005; Robinson 1976), it is expected that non-news has its greatest impact influencing
the negative views and outlooks of the audience. Rather than causing audience members to feel
more warmly towards certain groups, persons or ideas, non-news fosters negative feelings
towards certain out-groups targeted for ridicule or condemnation. Contrarily, some argue that
consumers of non-news may be intentionally seek out such programs precisely for the political
messages. In other words, low-information viewers may dislike “hard” news, but seek out “soft”
news formats in order to receive information about the wider world around them (Baum 2005).
In the light of their ubiquity, popularity and relevance to social scientists, this work focuses upon
religious television and satirical late night talk shows.
How should those who are exposed to religious broadcasting differ from not only the
general population, but from other religious Americans? In what way should consumers of
religious television be expected to differ from those who do not consume religious television?
How should consumers of satirical television differ from the general public, both in outlook and
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in their socio-demographic characteristics? One notable feature of religious broadcasting is that
there is an overt “us vs. them” component to the theology of many religious broadcasters. Those
who tune in to the program are “saved,” but the rest of society is not. Specific “out-groups” in
society are often targeted for ridicule and scorn, such as homosexuals and atheists (Bruce 1990;
Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Hughey (1990) calls this the distinction between the “righteous we”
and “sinful others”:
“…in apparent reluctance to offend the very people on whose financial generosity they
depend, modern televangelists generally imply that Hell is reserved for others. The viewing
audience is usually assumed to be among the ranks of the ‘Righteous We’…while responsibility
for any moral or other deficiencies in the larger society are pointedly attributed to ‘Sinful Others’
who are enemies of the godly-i.e, to abortionists, pornographers, homosexuals, rock stars, secular
humanists, and liberals in general”(Hughey 1990; 42).
Considering this dichotomous view of society being presented in religious television, one
composed of saved people of virtue and of damned sinners, it is expected that exposure to these
messages will lead to antipathy--if not outright hostility--towards the societal out-groups being
presented as sinful and Godless.
One of the key features of the audience for satirical media that has caused The Daily
Show to be of such interest among academics-as well as journalists and advertisers-is that its
audience skews young, college-educated and relatively affluent (Baumgartner and Morris 2006;
Cao 2008; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert et al. 2007; Hollander 2005;
LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). If satire is particularly the purview of young
educated urbanites, it stands to reason that the audience for such programs would skew liberal in
their tastes and outlooks. Where this dissertation is staking new ground is in stating that the type
of liberal outlooks and attitudes the viewers hold will be distinct from that of other well-educated
urban liberals. It is in the hostility towards selected out-groups, such as conservative political
figures and groups, where consumers of satirical media will be differentiated from their
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ideological and socio-demographic peers. It is also anticipated that increased consumption of
satirical late-night talk shows will not correlate significantly with increased positive feelings
towards liberal political figures or groups.

Conclusion
Media effects remains a thriving area of study in the social sciences. With the minimal
effects school having been largely discarded, social scientists have moved on to exploring the
specificities of media effects. This includes studying the distinct effects that different forms of
media have upon their audience. Works have demonstrated that television has a unique impact
upon the viewing audience, and have analyzed how different forms of television broadcasts can
have varying effects on viewers. While numerous works have examined the ways in which
overtly political television broadcasts-such as political advertisements, presidential debates and
cable news-can influence viewers’ opinions, few works in political science have looked to
explore the impact that the political messages contained in non-news broadcasts. This
dissertation fills that gap. Examining the case studies of satirical late night talk shows and
religious programming, this dissertation analyzes the impact these forms of television can have
on viewers’ opinions towards targeted out-groups. The next chapter will discuss the experiment
that utilized in measuring the effect that exposure to satirical or religious media can have upon a
viewers’ opinions towards specific out-groups.
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CHAPTER III: EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN: NON-NEWS SOURCES AND PROPOSITION 8

A major problem facing the researcher who wishes to measure media effects solely using
survey data is the potential of self-selection occurring in the audience. It is possible that there is
simply a unique subset of religious Americans, for example, who otherwise resemble other
religious Americans, but who hold particularly hostile opinions towards certain societal outgroups. These religious Americans would gravitate towards religious programming that reflects
their worldview. Thus, it could be possible that religious Americans who particularly dislike
homosexuals or atheists are also the religious Americans who tune in to watch religious
television due to the “righteous we vs. sinful others” messaging discussed in Chapter Two
(Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub 1988). Any analysis on data sets pertaining to television
viewing habits would run the risk of simply stating the obvious: people with certain views or
opinions watch television programs that reflect their views and opinions. This leads into an
additional potential hurdle, the idea that it may not be television influencing the viewer, but
viewers influencing the content of television programs.
The potential for self-selection biasing the results of any analysis would simultaneously
call into question the direction of the causal arrow of this study. One could argue that it is not the
case that religious media effects its audience, but that there is a core constituency that is
religiously and socially conservative. These religiously and socially conservative television
viewers could want to hear messages that reflect their hostility towards homosexuals or atheists,
and they would then tune in to programming that they feel accurately reflects their values.
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Producers of religious television programs would then change the content of their broadcasts to
make sure that it is particularly anti-homosexual or particularly anti-atheist. Similarly, it is
possible that those drawn to late-night comedy programs such as The Daily Show already have
little respect for conservative public figures. Other late night comedy producers and writers
would then scramble to make sure their programs are filled with as many jokes about
conservatives or Republicans as possible in order to attract these viewers. Simply put, there is a
possibility that the audience is influencing the television program content (Chozick 2011).
Network executives and the creative forces that are responsible for the content of television
programs may modify their product based on what it is that they feel the audience wants to hear
(Behr and Iyengar 1985). Fortunately, this argument has not proven insurmountable for media
effects scholars.
It is uncontroversial that networks air programs that they feel will attract viewers. In fact,
one of this study’s central arguments is that one reason for the hostility towards out-groups
present in these non-news sources of information is precisely in order to attract viewers; scholars
in the field have demonstrated that television viewers are attracted to conflict (Mutz 2007; Mutz
and Reeves 2005; Postman 1986). This fact does not mean that the programs do not still have an
impact in shaping the views and attitudes of its audience.12 Behr and Iyengar (1985)
demonstrated that news coverage is mostly unaffected by public opinion. To the contrary, what
Behr and Iyengar (1985) found was not that the public influenced media messages, but that
media messages were influencing the public. More recent studies confirmed the findings of Behr
and Iyengar (1985), and demonstrated that television news broadcasts did not just focus upon
those issues or topics that viewers wanted to hear. Additionally, it has been demonstrated that the
12

Nor does it change the fact that that television qua television is a hostile, confrontational form
of media (Forgette and Morris 2006; Mutz and Reeves 2005; Postman 1986; Robinson 1976).
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issues the media chooses to cover, and how the media chooses to cover those issues, influences
how viewers prioritized issues (Goidel and Langley 1995; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Miller 2007;
Mutz 1992). Coupled with the statistically significant findings from numerous scholars in the
field of media effects (Bartels 1993; Forgette and Morris 2006; Groseclose 2011; Martin 2008;
Mutz 1998; Zaller 1992; 1996), it can be stated with confidence that the influence that television
media has over the American public is not a mirage, and that television content is not just a
reflection of the values and norms of the home viewing audience. We know this in no small part
because of experiments that have been conducted by scholars demonstrating the impact of media
effects.
Experiments allow the researcher to probe, if not prove, causal hypotheses (Campbell and
Stanley 1966; Cook and Campbell 1979; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982). Additionally,
experimental research has gained increasing prominence among researchers looking to
demonstrate that media has more than just a minimal effect on its audience. Experimental
designs in both laboratory and field settings have repeatedly demonstrated that media messages
can cause change in political attitudes and behaviors (Forgette and Morris 2006; Gerber and
Green 2000; Gerber et al. 2007; Hayes 2008; Iyengar 1987; Iyengar 1991; Iyengar and Kinder
1987; Iyengar, Peters and Kinder 1982; Ladd 2009; Miller 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005;
Neuman, Just and Crigler 1992). This dissertation is therefore following accepted protocol in
utilizing an experimental design to measure media effects, but will be utilizing state of the art
resources such as Mechanical Turk and Qualtrics in doing so. There are some concerns in using
experimental designs in the social sciences, however, and those shall be addressed in the next
section.
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Experimental Methodology in Political Science
Cook and Campbell (1979) highlight one of the concerns in using an experimental setting
in the social sciences, the dilemma of making generalizable to the broader outside world the
results divined in the controlled laboratory environment:

“The advantages of experimental control for inferring causation have to be weighed
against the disadvantages that arise because we do not always want to learn about causation in
controlled settings. Instead, for many purposes, we would like to be able to generalize to causal
relationships in complex field settings, and we cannot easily assume that findings from the
laboratory will hold in the field…most of the social phenomena of theoretical and practical social
interest from which we want to generalize occur in markedly less controlled settings than either
the laboratory or the staged short-term experiment…” (Cook and Campbell 1979; 7).

An experimental design intended to capture media effects may lead to such a dilemma.
Consumers of religious or satirical media do not consume the media messages in “single-shot”
doses. Viewers of The Daily Show or The 700 Club may be frequent viewers, watching the
programs on a regular basis over a period of weeks, months or even years. Additionally, even
those who only sporadically view satirical or religious media do not do so in a controlled
laboratory environment. They may flip from channel-to-channel. They may have the television
on as white noise as they complete other tasks or eat meals. The broadcasts themselves may be
seen in the context of a larger television watching experience. Rather than viewing a
concentrated dose of satirical or religious television, a viewer may watch a hockey game, then
The Daily Show, then flip the channel to watch an action movie. In order to alleviate some of the
concerns addressed above, the present study will have the subjects view the required visual
materials in a time and place of their own choosing, rather than a laboratory or other unfamiliar
environment. It is also expected that the fact that the visual materials are to be consumed on-line,
at the leisure of the subject, may offer more of an ersatz approximation of the television viewing
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experience than requiring the subjects to watch the visual materials in a classroom or other
controlled environment.
There are also concerns that subjects in a social science experiment may attempt to adjust
their behavior "given the artificiality of the research setting and their perceptions of the aims of
the study" (Norris and Sanders 1998; 7). However, previous experimental works on media
effects have instituted mechanisms that attempt to control for these factors. In order to try to
control for subjects altering their behavior in order to conform to what they think is "correct"
deception has been employed in order to keep subjects unsure as to the researcher's true aims
(Norris and Sanders 1998). In the present case, respondents were told that they were being asked
as to their television viewing habits, rather than being told that the experiment was seeking to
study media effects. Answering critics (Livingston 1996) who say that experiments such as the
one utilized in this dissertation are too far removed from realistic television viewing habits as it
provides only a single “dose” of video treatment, as opposed to measuring long-term effects of
consuming media messages, it has even been argued that the use of a single-shot experiment
ensures that respondents do not become conditioned to the experimental setting itself (Norris and
Sanders 1998; Norris and Sanders 2002). Experiments have also shown that such single-shot
exposures to stimuli can produce the anticipated responses, but that the effects dissipate quickly,
"so organizations using this kind of mobilization tool should either rely on repeated exposure or
on an immediate capitalization of the mobilization effort" (Hooghe et al. 2010; 422). The
dissipation of the effect is why the respondents in my experimental design are instructed to
complete the post-screening questionnaire promptly upon viewing of the visual materials.
Experimental Design
This dissertation uses respondents recruited via the Amazon service Mechanical Turk
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(MTurk)13, as that the use of undergraduate college students could lead to problems in terms of
the generalizability of the findings. While scholars in other disciplines were the vanguard in
using MTurk to recruit subjects, political scientists have begun to take advantage of the pool of
respondents offered by MTurk (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang and
Gosling 2011; Chandler and Kapelner 2010; Chen and Horton 2010; Schaffner 2011; Sorokin
and Forsyth 2008). The use of MTurk allows the analysis to feature respondents who are more
representative of the population of the United States than those used in published political
science articles which utilize samples of undergraduates alone to be analyzed in this dissertation
(Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012). Berinsky, Huber and Lenz (2012) detail the operations of
MTurk in their article:
“To initiate a survey using MTurk, a researcher (a “Requester” in Amazon’s lingo) establishes an
account (www.mturk.com), places funds into her account, and then posts a “job listing” using the
MTurk web interface that describes the Human Intelligence Task (HIT) to be completed and the
compensation to be paid…Each HIT has a designated number of tasks and the requester can
specify how many times an individual MTurk “Worker” can undertake the task. Researchers can
also set requirements for subjects, including country of residence and prior “approval rate”…The
MTurk interface gives the researcher a great deal of flexibility to conduct a study. In addition to
using MTurk’s embedded workspace to set up simple tasks, the researcher can also refer subjects
to an external website. For instance, subjects might be redirected to a webpage to take a survey
with an embedded experimental manipulation…Additionally, outside websites make it easy to
obtain informed consent, implement additional screening procedures, debrief after an
experiment, and collect detailed information about the survey process (including response times
for items…The final stage for the researcher is compensating subjects. The researcher can easily
authorize payment for the task through the MTurk web interface” (Berinsky, Huber and Lenz
2012; 352-353).

While respondents were recruited using MTurk, the experimental design in this
dissertation is hosted online by the Qualtrics.com service. While thus far there are few published
works in the social sciences that have taken advantage of the services provided by Qualtrics

13

The experimental design was initially piloted at The University of Mississippi during the
summer of 2012 in order to test face validity and technical issues.
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(Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012; Lede Zuniga, Jung and Valenzuela 2012), academics in a wide
variety of other fields have published research that has utilized Qualtrics to host surveys and also
to recruit panels (Manuj et al. 2011; Patrick and Hagtvedt 2012; Rebman et al. 2012).
Structure of The Experimental Design
Subjects were randomly divided into three groups. The first group received a threeminute clip of religious media, specifically, a clip from The 700 Club featuring Pat Robertson
discussing California’s Proposition 8.14 The second group received a three-minute clip of
satirical media, specifically, a clip from Comedy Central’s The Daily Show featuring Jon Stewart
discussing California’s Proposition 815. The third group is the control group, and received a
three-minute clip of network news16 reporting on the same issue being discussed in the visual
materials presented to the two test groups. There are several reasons why Proposition 8 was
selected to be the issue discussed in each clip. The debate over Proposition 8--and the coverage
of that debate--featured each of the out-groups targeted by the respective forms of non-news
television analyzed in this dissertation. Homosexuals and gay rights supporters were visible in
their opposition to Proposition 8, just as conservative Christian groups, particularly the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, were visible in their support for the measure. This means
that both religious television programs and satirical television programs were able to take stark
14

Proposition 8 was a California ballot measure/state constitutional amendment voted on in
November of 2008. The measure stated, in the part relevant to this dissertation, “only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California”. The clip from The 700 Club is
a newscaster’s commentary on Proposition 8 from the June 16th, 2008, episode of The 700 Club
and Pat Robertson’s commentary on gay marriage in California from the December 12th, 2007,
episode of The 700 Club. Robertson’s commentary in the June 16th episode, complete with
references to “fire and brimstone” and a graphic retelling of the legend of Sodom and Gomorrah,
was thought too incendiary for the purposes of this experiment.
15
The segment, entitled “I Now Denounce You Chuck and Larry” is from episode #13142 of
The Daily Show, originally aired November 3rd, 2008.
16
KCRA 3, NBC’s local affiliate in Sacramento, California. The video was uploaded to
YouTube by KCRA’s official YouTube account on October 20, 2008.
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positions on the issue-and make clear just who the opposition is. Additionally, the fact that both
The 700 Club and The Daily Show discussed the issue several times allowed for the researcher to
have a selection of from which they could choose the appropriate treatments for this study.
As MTurk users could access the survey at the time and place of their choosing the
experimental occasions, as well as the answering of the pre-screening questionnaires, has been
randomized. This was done in order to achieve “balanced representation” of potential sources of
bias such as “…time of day, day of week, portion of semester, nearness to examinations, etc.”
(Campbell and Stanley 1966; 184). Each respondent in the same session will thus have more
similar intrasession histories, and thus have sources of similarity other than the exposure to the
visual materials (Campbell and Stanley 1966). Each test subject was given a prescreening
questionnaire in order to obtain socio-demographic information, as well as determine their
partisanship and ideology, their religiosity, and how often they consume religious, satirical and
news media. After then being exposed to one of the three video clips, test subjects were then
each given a brief post-screening questionnaire to gauge their opinions as to both the issue of gay
marriage as well as the selected out-groups that were featured within the visual materials.
Hypotheses
Robinson’s (1976) videomalaise theory and its progeny propose that television presents a
distorted vision of reality that is more negative and conflict-laden than the world outside the
television screen (Dahl 1967; Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and
Reeves 2005). It is thus anticipated that exposure to non-news programs that contain political
messages will lead to increased antipathy towards the out-groups targeted for derision in those
programs. It is also anticipated that exposure to the treatments will not lead to a corresponding
increase in warm feelings towards the implied in-groups for each form of media. While
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television can present external targets for hostility or contempt, videomalaise theory taken to its
next logical step would hold that television does not also foster positive, inclusive sentiments
towards the “in group” broadcasting the message. In other words, television is a tool that can
knock down, but it cannot build back up. Considering the work done in political science as well
as in fields such as psychology demonstrating the importance of emotions in how humans make
decisions as to how to react to stimuli, and the precedence that negative emotions have in this
decision making process, it is further expected that viewership of non-news programs will lead
respondents to feel negatively towards the out-groups featured in those programs without any
corresponding positive feelings towards the groups diametrically opposed to those out-groups
(Carter, Stamm and Heintz-Knowles 1992; Damasio 2003; Gunnell 2007; Lodge, McGraw and
Stroh 1989; Lodge, Steenbergen and Brau 1995; Lodge, Stroh and Wahlke 1990 McCombs
1999; Marcus, Neuman and MacKuen 2000; Martin 2008; Miller 2007; Mutz 2007; Zajonc
1980). This leads to four hypotheses that will be tested using this experimental design:
H1. Exposure to religious media should increase negative feelings towards homosexuals, and
exposure to satirical media should not affect feelings towards homosexuals.
H1A. Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have a lower mean Feeling Towards
Homosexuals score than subjects viewing the Local News video.
H1B. Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have the same mean Feeling Towards
Homosexuals score as subjects viewing the Local News video.
H2. Exposure to religious media should increase antipathy for gay marriage, and exposure to
satirical media should not affect feelings towards gay marriage.
H2A. Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have a lower mean Support For SameSex Marriage score than subjects viewing the Local News video
H2B. Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have the same mean Support For
Same-Sex Marriage score as subjects viewing the Local News video.
H3. Exposure to religious media should not affect feelings towards the Church of Latter-Day
Saints (CLDS), and exposure to satirical media should increase negative feelings towards the
CLDS.
H3A. Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have the same mean Feeling Towards
CLDS score as subjects viewing the Local News video.
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H3B. Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have a lower mean Feeling Towards
CLDS score than subjects viewing the Local News video.
H4. Exposure to religious media should not affect feelings towards conservative Christians, and
exposure to satirical media should increase negative feelings conservative Christians.
H4A. Subjects viewing The 700 Club video should have the same mean Feelings Towards
Conservative Christians score as subjects viewing the Local News video.
H4B. Subjects viewing The Daily Show video should have a lower mean Feelings Towards
Conservative Christians score than subjects viewing the Local News video.

The testing of the hypotheses was conducted in two stages. For each treatment, there was
one level of analysis where all respondents exposed to a given treatment were analyzed. There
was a second level of analysis where respondents were grouped by partisan affiliation. The two
levels of analysis enables the researcher-and the readers of this dissertation-to explore first
whether there is a more general effect from consuming non-news programs with political
messages, and secondly, whether there is also partisanship-determined effect that comes from
consuming such messages. The second stage of analysis also allows for the researcher to
determine whether the general effects of consuming non-news programs with political messages
are, in fact, being driven by the partisanship of the viewing audience.
Data
In total there were 175 respondents in the experimental design coming from MTurk.
MTurk workers were financially compensated for their participation, being paid $0.25 for their
completion of the survey17. Of the 175 respondents, roughly 63% returned surveys completed in
their entirety, and there is an n of 110 completed surveys. A total of 134 respondents were
exposed to one of the three treatments. Many respondents answered the questions of interest to

17

As referenced in Berinsky, Huber and Lenz 2012, MTurk can be used to route workers to
surveys hosted on other online sources, such as Qualtrics, and that is what was done for this
dissertation. MTurk workers were provided with the same randomized, two-digit code and
timestamp, and provided this to the author. Payment was then authorized for the MTurk workers.
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this dissertation, but skipped over questions that were not analyzed. Excluding these respondents
from analysis serves little utility. Analysis conducted on all returned surveys, rather than simply
the completed surveys, is therefore presented in this dissertation18. Earlier, published studies that
have used experimental designs to measure media effects used sample sizes of less than 100; 85
respondents were used in Iyengar’s 1987 article, and only 28 to 29 respondents were used in
Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder’s 1982 article. More recent published works in the media effects
literature have used much larger groups. Recent published works include sample sizes of 468
(Miller 2007) and 919 (Norris and Sanders) being used in some designs. Experimental designs
most similar to the one utilized in this dissertation have used sample sizes of 135 (Forgette and
Morris 2006) and 157 (Hayes 2008). It is safe to say that the present work’s sample size will be
sufficient to derive generalizable, relevant results.
Among respondents who completed the entire survey, 36 received the satirical treatment,
41 received the religious treatment and 33 received the local news/control treatment. Among all
respondents who received one of the three treatments, 50 received the religious treatment, 45
received the satirical treatment and 39 received the local news/control treatment. The average
age for respondents is 36. The age of respondents runs from a low of 18 years old to a high of 67
years old. Partisanship among respondents skews more Democratic than the national average,

18

Analysis was also conducted on only the 110 surveys that were completed in their entirety.
Apart from exposure to The Daily Show leading to more positive feelings towards CLDS among
Republican respondents, albeit not at a statistically significant level, there were no statistically
significant differences between the analysis conducted on only those surveys completed in their
entirety and those surveys where questions of interest were answered, but the surveys were not
completed.
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with 30.83% of respondents considering themselves to be Republican or leaning Republican,
9.02% considering themselves Independent and 60.15% Democratic or leaning Democratic.19
The dependent variable used to test for feelings towards homosexuals is a 100-point
feeling thermometer, where respondents were told to place the thermometer on a scale of “0”
(lowest) to “100” (highest) to gauge their feelings towards homosexuals20. Analysis of the pool
of respondents reveals significant findings (See Table 3.1).

19

Recent (2011) national polls showed the partisan split of the United States to be 31%
Democratic, 27% Republican and 40% Independent (Jones 2012).
20

One possible point of confusion due to the way the feeling thermometers are numbered (0100) is that some respondents may have intended to indicate the strongest possible displeasure
for a group by leaving the feeling thermometer at “0” and other respondents may simply have not
answered the question at all.
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Table 3.1. Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Homosexuals” Scores
Media
(Video)
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Democrats and
Democrat-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Republicans and
Republican-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
a

n
48
36
43

27
23
27

16
9
12

Mean
(std. err.)
45.688
(4.287)

Difference
from Local
News mean

Hypothesis
H1A
H0: Diff ≥ 0

t-statistic
(p-value)
–2.490
(.0076)

---

---

---

0.191

H1B
H0: Diff = 0

0.025
(.9799)

–22.475

H1A
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–2.490
(.0043)

---

---

---

–9.253

H1B
H0: Diff = 0

–1.062
(.2945)

–17.514

H1A
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–1.271
(.2200)

---

---

---

7.6111

H1B
H0: Diff = 0

0.519
(.6102)

–17.424

63.111
(5.702)
63.302
(5.035)

52.481
(5.753)
74.957
(5.807)
65.957
(6.374)

34.375
(5.992)
51.889
(11.001)
59.500
(9.154)

a

Both H1A and H1B difference-in-means tests assume equal variances. ; p-values for equal variance F-tests
are .2880 for H1A and .6386 for H1B. For Democrats only, they are .9700 and .7534, respectively. For
Republicans only they are .3573 and .8743, respectively.
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Compared to the control group--respondents exposed to the local news clip discussing
Proposition 8--respondents exposed to the clip of religious media have statistically significantly
lower opinions towards homosexuals. Using a two-sample t-test with equal variances, the
difference in means drops from an average of 63 for respondents exposed to local news to an
average approximately 46 for respondents exposed to the clip from The 700 Club (See Table
3.1). When the partisanship of the respondents is taken into consideration, exposure to the clip
from The 700 Club is still shown to demonstrate stronger antipathy towards homosexuals than
found in the control group. Most striking is the fact that there is a large and statistically
significant drop in feelings towards homosexuals among Democrats who view the clip from The
700 Club (See Table 3.1). Democratic respondents exposed to the local news clip had an average
feeling thermometer score of 75 towards homosexuals, while Democrats exposed to the clip from
The 700 Club reported an average feeling score of 52. This 23-point difference is statistically
significant at the .01 level (See Table 3.1). Republicans exposed to local news have lower mean
feelings towards homosexuals-a mean score of approximately 52-than Democrats exposed to
either The 700 Club or to those exposed to local news. Republicans exposed to The 700 Club
have an even lower mean score towards homosexuals, approximately 34, but the difference
between Republicans exposed to local news and Republicans exposed to The 700 Club was not
found to be statistically significant at the .05 level (See Table 3.1). It should be noted that, even
while not significant at the .05 level, the difference between the control group and the test group
still moved in the appropriate direction to support Hypothesis 1. Coupled with the significant
findings when respondents are not examined according to party, as well as the significant
differences found between Democrats who were placed in the control group and Democrats
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exposed to The 700 Club, it can be said that analysis of the homosexual feeling thermometer has
yielded significant support for Hypothesis 1.
Feelings towards homosexuals was also used as a dependent variable during multivariate
analysis. In an ordinary least squares model, exposure to The 700 Club, partisanship--where
Republicans and Republican-leaning Independents were coded “-1,” Independents coded “0,”
and Democrats and Democratic-leaning Independents were coded “1,”--age--an interval variable
where respondents wrote in their age--and religiosity--an additive variable using questions
asking respondents as to their church attendance and their belief in Biblical literalism--were used
as independent variables as a way to test for the impact that exposure to The 700 Club had upon
views towards homosexuals while still controlling for other pertinent factors. As Table 3.2
demonstrates, even when additional controls were added, exposure to The 700 Club resulted in
statistically significantly lowered feelings towards homosexuals. At the .05 level, exposure to
The 700 Club resulted in a 17.6 point difference in feelings towards homosexuals, controlling for
the respondents’ partisan affiliation, age, and religiosity. Unexpectedly, exposure to The 700
Club also led to significantly lower feelings towards The Church of Latter-Day Saints. As Table
3.4 indicates, this decrease is most pronounced in Democratic and Independent respondents.
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Table 3.2. OLS and Logit Estimations

Independent
Variable
Constant

Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable
OLS
OLS
Logit
OLS
Feelings toward
Feelings
Not opposed to
Feelings
conservative
towards gays
gay marriage
towards CLDS
Christians
82.928
2.003
11.765
18.147
(14.078)
(1.130)
(10.844)
(11.116)

Religious
treatment
dummy

–17.641
(7.098)
p = .014

–1.140
(0.586)
p =.052

–13.822
(5.387)
p = .012

3.646
(5.487)
p = .832

Satirical
treatment
dummy

–2.072
(7.069)
p = .770

–0.816
(0.588)
p = .544

–1.218
(5.380)
p = .821

1.166
(5.487)
p = .832

Democrat
dummy

8.707
(10.659)
p = .416

1.720
(0.828)
p = .038

–1.788
(8.164)
p = .827

–10.378
(8.362)
p = .217

Republican
dummy

–6.872
(11.386)
p = .547

–6.872
(11.386)
p = .547

14.647
(8.665)
p = .094

12.087
(8.880)
p = .176

Religiosity

–3.220
(1.644)
p = .053

–0.374
(0.137)
p = .006

4.353
(1.258)
p = .053

10.427
(1.286)
p = .000

–0.426
(0.208)
p = .043
116
.172
4.99

–0.035
(0.017)
p = .039
119
.265
43.53

0.350
(0.162)
p = .033
115
.227
6.59

0.104
(0.165)
p = .532

Age
n
Adj. R2
F, χ2
Note:

116
.464
17.56

p –values are for two-tailed tests. F-statistics are shown for the OLS regressions, and the χ2-statistic is
shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2 shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated
by Stata.

Hypothesis 2 predicts that exposure to The 700 Club should result in decreased support
for same-sex marriage and that exposure to The Daily Show should not have a statistically
significant impact on support for same-sex marriage. Support for same-sex marriage was gauged
in the post-screening series of questions using a five-point ordinal variable where respondents
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were asked as to how strongly they agreed/disagreed with a statement saying that same-sex
marriages should have the same rights and legal recognition as traditional marriages. This
variable was then converted into a binomial variable whereby respondents expressing support for
gay marriage were coded as “1” and those opposed to gay marriage were coded as “0.” Using a
Pearson’s chi-square test, it was found that respondents who were exposed to The 700 Club were
significantly less likely to support gay marriage than respondents who were exposed to the local
news clip (See Table 3.3). When examining whether party played a role in respondents views
towards gay marriage, both Democrats and Republicans who were exposed to The 700 Club
were less likely to support gay marriage than those exposed to the local news clip (See Table
3.3).
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Table 3.3. Comparison of Proportions of Subjects Opposed to Gay Marriage
Media
(Video)
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Democrats and
Democrat-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Republicans and
Republican-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Independents
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
a

n
49
38
43

28
24
27

16
10
12

4
4
4

Difference
from Local
News pct.

Pct. (No.)
opposed to
gay marriagea
53.06
(26)

Hypothesis
H2A
H0: Diff ≤ 0

z-statistic
(p-value)
2.004
(.0225)

---

---

---

12.61

H2B
H0: Diff = 0

1.165
(.2440)

22.62

H2A
H0: Diff ≤ 0

1.795
(.0363)

---

---

5.56

H2B
H0: Diff = 0

0.499
(.6179)

15.00

H2A
H0: Diff ≤ 0

0.806
(.2101)

---

---

23.33

H2B
H0: Diff = 0

1.224
(.2211)

25.00

H2A
H0: Diff ≤ 0

0.730
(.2326)

---

---

---

25.00

H2B
H0: Diff = 0

0.730
(.4652)

21.48

31.58
(12)
44.19
(19)

39.29
(11)
16.67
(4)
22.22
(6)

75.00
(12)
60.00
(6)
83.33
(10)

75.00
(3)
50.00
(2)
75.00
(3)

Percent of subjects answering either “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree” to the statement “Marriages between
same-sex couples should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages.
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Among Democrats this decrease in support for gay marriage was, as seen when analyzing
Democrats’ feelings towards homosexuals after exposure to The 700 Club, statistically
significant. Among Republicans, the decrease was again not found to be significant. A logit
model which incorporated the same controls in testing for the impact of exposure to religious
media on feelings towards same-sex marriage found that exposure to The 700 Club again
resulted in statistically significant movement in the expected direction (See Table 3.2).
Testing the impact of consuming satirical media produces statistically insignificant
results. Exposure to The Daily Show does not increase positive feelings among Democrats--or
non-Democrats--towards homosexuals or towards gay marriage (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3).
We do not see Democrats moving favorably towards gay marriage or towards homosexuals upon
exposure to The Daily Show. In fact, there is a drop in feelings towards both homosexuals and
towards gay marriage among Democrats after exposure to The Daily Show, although this
movement is statistically insignificant (See Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3). Exposure to The Daily Show
produced mixed and statistically insignificant results among Republicans, with Republicans
being exposed to the satirical media treatment having slightly warmer feelings towards
homosexuals than those in the control group (See Table 3.1), but being less likely to support gay
marriage (Table 3.3).
As to the impact of The Daily Show increasing out-group alienation towards the groups
targeted for ridicule or scorn in the context of its comedy--in this case, conservative Christians
and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints--among Democrats results again move in the
predicted directions, but fail to reach statistical significance (See Tables 3.4 and 3.5).
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Table 3.4 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward the Church of Latter-Day Saints”
Scores
Difference
Media
Mean
from Local
t-statistic
a
(Video)
n
(std. err.)
News mean
Hypothesis
(p-value)
Religious
26.404
H3A
–1.362
47
–7.380
(The 700 Club)
(3.327)
H0: Diff = 0
(.1768)
Local News
33.784
37
------(KCRA 3 News)
(4.408)
Satirical
34.405
H3B
0.102
42
0.621
(The Daily Show)
(4.147)
H0: Diff ≥ 0
(.5406)
Democrats and
Democrat-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Republicans and
Republican-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)

26
23
26

16
10
12

23.115
(5.753)
32.870
(6.168)
25.423
(6.374)

34.750
(5.992)
37.300
(3.792)
56.667
(8.604)

–9.754

H3A
H0: Diff = 0

–1.313
(.1967)

---

---

---

–7.447

H3B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–1.020
(.1872)

–2.550

H3A
H0: Diff = 0

–0.340
(.7369)

---

---

---

19.367

H3B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

2.060
(.9714)

–15.750

H3A
H0: Diff = 0

–0.707
(.5191)

---

---

---

–4.250

H3B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–0.176
(.4330)

Independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
a

4
4
4

14.500
(8.190)
30.250
(20.72)
26.000
(12.40)

Equal-variance difference-in-means t-tests are conducted if the p-value for the equal variance F-test is < .20;
otherwise unequal-variances t-tests are conducted. F-tests p-values are .2990 for H3A and .9711 for H3B.
For Democrats-only, they are .1045 and .0592, respectively. For Republicans-only they are .0249 and .0108,
respectively.
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Table 3.5 Comparison of Mean “Feelings Toward Conservative Christian” Scores
Media
(Video)
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Democrats and
Democrat-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
Republicans and
Republican-leaning
independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)

n
47
37
43

26
23
27

16
10
12

Mean
(std. err.)
44.745
(4.819)
36.405
(4.423)
39.535
(4.928)

Difference
from Local
News mean

Hypothesisa
H4A
H0: Diff = 0

t-statistic
(p-value)
–1.244
(.2170)

---

---

---

3.130

H4B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

0.466
(.6788)

–0.045

H4A
H0: Diff = 0

–0.005
(.9958)

---

---

---

–2.465

H4B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–0.297
(.3837)

15.825

H4A
H0: Diff = 0

1.506
(.1450)

---

---

---

20.450

H4B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

1.915
(.9651)

28.500

H4A
H0: Diff = 0

1.132
(.3007)

---

---

---

–12.250

H4B
H0: Diff ≥ 0

–0.658
(.2674)

–8.340

33.346
(5.954)
33.391
(6.174)
30.926
(5.557)

60.625
(5.992)
44.800
(6.081)
65.250
(8.307)

Independents only
Religious
(The 700 Club)
Local News
(KCRA 3 News)
Satirical
(The Daily Show)
a

4
4
4

61.250
(20.67)
32.750
(14.36)
20.500
(11.86)

Equal-variance difference-in-means t-tests are conducted if the p-value for the equal variance F-test is < .20;
otherwise unequal-variances t-tests are conducted. F-tests p-values are .2041 for H4A and .2640 for H4B.
For Democrats-only, they are .9112 and .8945, respectively. For Republicans-only they are .2001 and .2362,
respectively.
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The dependent variables used in this series of tests are 100-point feeling thermometers
where respondents were told to place on a scale of “0” (lowest) to “100” (warmest) their feelings
towards The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and conservative Christians,
respectively. It is worth noting that Republicans exposed to the satirical media treatment grew
more fond of both conservative Christians and of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, although this movement is only marginally (at the .10 level) significant (See Tables 3.4
and 3.5). It is possible that there is a kind of “backlash” effect that comes from being exposed to
television programs that explicitly mock or ridicule one’s beliefs or one’s peer group.
Conclusion
Exposure to the religious media treatment resulted in statistically significantly lower
feelings towards homosexuals and towards gay marriage among Democrats, but not Republicans.
Why might this be so? Readers should recall the strong link between televangelism and the tent
revivals of the early-to-mid 20th Century. The purpose of conducting revivals was not to “preach
to the choir,” but to win new converts and bring those who were unchurched or who had fallen
away from religion back into regular church attendance (Harrell 1985). It is thus possible that Pat
Robertson’s message is not tailored to be most persuasive among Republicans--who already had
fairly negative opinions towards homosexuals and gay marriage--but among Democrats who had
minimal experience in being exposed to that sort of rhetoric. Readers should also bear in mind
that Pat Robertson is a highly charismatic21 man who has had a great deal of success over his
four-decade long broadcasting career. It therefore stands to reason that those who have never
heard Robertson’s message before could find themselves, at least momentarily, swayed by

21

The word “charismatic” is here being used in the secular sense, meaning, “exercising a
compelling charm that inspires devotion in others.”
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Robertson’s appeals to national unity and his claim that no nation that has promoted
homosexuality has endured. Similarly, Democratic respondents may have been familiar with The
Daily Show and already held crystallized opinions towards Mormons and Christian
conservatives. As such, Stewart’s ridicule of these groups presented the respondents with nothing
unfamiliar and thus failed to “move the dial.” The fact that neither treatment caused statistically
significant increased warmth towards in-groups bolsters the argument of this dissertation that
television does little to increase positive feelings, but much to increase alienation and mistrust of
societal “others.”
As with any experimental design, there may be questions about the external validity of
the results. The reasons for the statistical significance in consuming the religious media
treatment, but not the satirical media treatment, could be contingent upon the vagaries of this
particular pool of respondents. In order to demonstrate the broad generalizability of the central
theses of this dissertation, the following chapter explores the impact of consuming non-news
programming with political messaging--again religious and satirical television--by analyzing
large-n, nationally collected cross-sectional data.
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL DATA

Chapter Three presented results of an experimental design demonstrating that
respondents exposed to religious media had increased antipathy towards targeted social outgroups. Chapter Three also presented mixed results regarding the consumption of satirical media.
Having utilized an experimental design to explore the impact of consuming non-news programs
that contain political messages, this dissertation now looks to test these results with larger
samples in a less controlled setting. In order to test the external validity of the last chapter’s
findings, this chapter uses large-n cross-sectional data to test four hypotheses. It is expected that
increased exposure to satirical media and religious media will be correlated with increased
antipathy towards targeted out-groups. However, it is anticipated that there will be no
corresponding increased warm feelings towards liberal groups or public figures associated with
increased consumption of satirical media. It will additionally be demonstrated that consumers of
religious media are not necessarily members of The Religious Right by demonstrating
distinctions between consumers of religious media and agreement with planks of the Republican
Party platform.
What is a Religious Television “Viewer,” and What is “Viewing”?
Despite the great changes in the world of mass media in the past thirty years, it still
stands to reason that the religious television viewer remains distinct from the viewers of the
various flavors of non-religious television. Academic work following Gerbner et al. (1984)
explores the question of who consumes religious media, and has found that the consumer of
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religious media is distinct from the general public in several notable ways (Abelman 1987a;
Hoover 1987; Pettersson 1986). This work shall demonstrate not only that the consumer of
religious media is distinct from the general public, but that it is due to their consumption of
religious television that they are distinct. It will also be demonstrated that consumers of satirical
television possess socio-demographic factors differentiating themselves from the American
public, generally, but also different attitudes. Again, it will be demonstrated that it is the
consumption of the satirical television messages that causes the viewer to hold these distinct
views. Viewers of satirical media have been found to be generally younger, better educated,
more likely to be urban and more affluent than the general public (Baumgartner and Morris
2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert
et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011) but there has been
no study akin to Gerbner et al. (1984) proffering that there exists an entire “satirical
mainstream,” to act as a basis of comparison. There is also no question about how to define a
“viewer” of satirical television. This is not the case with religious television.
There are a few hurdles facing the researcher who wishes to measure attributes among
those who watch religious television in the United States. Some of these hurdles do not exist in
such treacherous form for those wishing to study the media effects of other television broadcasts,
such as the other subject of this dissertation, satirical media. These hurdles include the fact that
religious television programming has proven controversial. In order to minimize--or inflate--the
influence of religious broadcasters, detractors and televangelists each had a vested interest in the
number of viewers of religious television. This made the total number of viewers of religious
television a contentious political point. Another hurdle is defining what is meant by “religious
programming,” given the wide variety of television shows that can be considered religious.
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Finally, there is also the difficulty of answering the first question that must be addressed: what is
a “viewer?”
A problem that has vexed researchers is simply determining what constitutes “viewing”
in a basic, empirical sense. While reliable numbers can be obtained in terms of how many
religious television channels, radio stations and television programs exist (Stacey and Shupe
1982), more ticklish is the matter of determining how many viewers of religious broadcasting
there are. The basic question that must be tackled is, how much religious broadcasting does one
have to view in order to be classified as someone who views religious broadcasting? Estimates
have varied from under 10 million Americans to over 100 million Americans (Horsfield 1984;
Hoover 1987; Stacey and Shupe 1982). It should be kept in mind, too, that the size of the
audience for The Electronic Church is a somewhat controversial subject. Just as critics and
detractors of The Electronic Church want to minimize the influence of religious television,
supporters of religious television--the televangelists themselves, in particular--have an interest in
claiming a much larger audience share than they may actually command (Abelman and
Neuendorf 1987; Horsfield 1984; Hughey 1990). A recent (April, 2001) Pew Research Center
poll indicated that 49% of all Americans watched religious television, or listened to religious
radio shows, “at least sometimes,” with 20% listening “frequently.” 16% stated they “hardly
ever” watched religious television or listened to religious radio shows, with only 34% saying
they never listened to or watched religious broadcasting (Pew Research Center 2001). The very
different numbers produced when trying to determine the audience for religious media come in
no small part from the very different ways used in calculating how much time one has to report
watching religious broadcasting in order to be classified as a “viewer.”

61

The A.C. Nielsen Company, in their 1985 survey commissioned by Pat Robertson’s
Christian Broadcasting Network, defined someone as a “viewer” of religious broadcasting if they
watched six minutes or more of such programming in a month, while two academic studies only
defined someone as a viewer of religious broadcasting if they watched fifteen or more minutes of
such programming in a week (Hoover 1987). While researchers have made headway into
understanding the demographic characteristics of the audience of religious broadcasting, one
thing that is not clear is just how many Americans actually view religious broadcasting. Even
keeping these difficulties in mind, reliable estimates for the number of Americans watching
religious programming still put the number of viewers around 15-20 million Americans a week
(Bruce 1990; Green 1992; Hoover 1987). This is a significant bloc of the United States
population.
The GSS data utilized for the present study defines viewership in terms of how many
hours and minutes a week a respondent watches “religious shows on television.” Rather than
dealing with the difficult matter of defining someone as a “viewer” of religious programming,
analysis can be performed in order to see relationships between increased viewership of religious
broadcasting and the holding of specific beliefs and attitudes. By focusing on whether or not
watching more religious programming makes one more or less likely to hold certain beliefs, the
dissertation does not need to address head-on the more difficult question of assigning the label of
“viewer” to someone who watches religious programming based on how often they watch
religious programming.
The question as to how to define someone as being a “viewer” of religious programming
is related to another difficulty in attempting to examine the consumption of religious media; the
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multitude of religious programming that is being treated as the monolithic concept, “religious
programming.” As Abelman (1987) discusses:
“Religious fare consists of just about every popular secular programming genre,
including talk shows (“The 700 Club”), game shows (“Bible Bowl”), children’s shows (“Davy
and Goliath”), soap operas (“Another Life”), news-magazine shows (“Reel to Real”), sports
programming (“Athletes in Action”) and music/variety shows (“PTL Club”) (Abelman 1987;
200)22

Viney (1999) and Park and Baker (2007) each provide more recent breakdowns of this
wide variety of religious programming, and the respective audiences for each type of religious
television program. Due to the somewhat distinct nature of the television industry in the United
Kingdom23--the area of focus for Viney (1999)--an in depth analysis of Viney (1999) would
provide more diversion than insight as to the areas of interest for this dissertation. More utility
will be derived from exploring Park and Baker (2007) and their exploration of religious media in
the American context. Park and Baker (2007) analyze the variety of religious programs and
theatrically released motion pictures--among other forms of media--and find some distinguishing
features between those who consume the distinct forms of religious television programs. To
provide an example of the diverse forms of religious mass media and their audiences, it was
demonstrated that viewers of Touched by an Angel were more likely to be older, female and far
less likely to be well educated than those who viewed the Mel Gibson film The Passion of the
Christ. Overall, respondents were more likely to have viewed more mainstream programs on

22

See also Straub (1988) and the discussion on Pat Robertson’s CBN founding a news program
and a soap opera; pgs. 72-74, 82-87
23
Including, but not limited to, state ownership of the major television networks in the United
Kingdom, the lack of any strictly religious television networks and the fact that religious
programs must conform to the ITC Programme Code. It still warrants mentioning that Svennevig
et al. (1988), which also looked at the audiences for religious programming in the UK, found that
viewers of religious programming tended to be older and female. Viney (1999) also found that
the most popular religious program, Songs of Praise had an older audience.
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network television such as Seventh Heaven, Touched by an Angel or Joan of Arcadia than have
watched charismatic faith-healer--and former regent of Oral Roberts University (Bransetter
2007)--Benny Hinn’s cable-only broadcast, This is Your Day. Unsurprisingly, mothers were most
likely to have viewed the direct-to-video children’s series VeggieTales (Park and Baker 2007).
In short, this study is trying to deal with a broad swath of programs as a singular entity. While it
seems difficult to imagine that someone who would not otherwise watch religious programming
would make sure to tune into Another Life, it would have been beneficial to have been presented
with data that would allow a researcher to distinguish just what sorts of religious programs the
consumers of religious media are consuming. There are studies that addressed the content and
format of religious television programs, but it would be presumptuous to assume that the figures
presented in their work would be determinative of the formats viewed by the respondents in the
GSS survey data (Abelman and Neuendorf 1987; Hadden and Swann 1981 Park and Baker 2007;
Viney 1999).
The final hurdle in trying to collect data on the American public’s use of religious
broadcasting is what, exactly, constitutes use (Abelman 1987a). Hoover (1987) confronts the
issue of trying to distinguish the quality of viewing and participation. Involvement in religious
broadcasting, more than other types of media, can be seen as more than simply viewing the
programs. As Hoover explains:
“Some contributors and ‘members’, seem not to view much at all, but can also articulate
their sense of identification by contributing, subscribing to publications, attending local meetings
of support groups for the broadcasters, traveling to the center where the program is produced,
and participating in allied ministries and activities promoted by the broadcasts…Simply put, the
measures of viewing most often used to assess the “audience” of the “Electronic Church” are
totally inadequate to assess the depth and quality of the viewing experience, and are thus poorly
fitted to the task of explaining the overall “impact” of religious broadcasting in any detail.”
(Hoover 1987; 148)
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Thus, there is also the matter of intensity of viewership, something not regularly of
concern in terms of media studies. Generally speaking one is or is not a viewer of a particular
television program. When that program is built around exhortations for contributions, however,
and indeed, when the lifeblood of the televangelist’s ministry is receiving contributions from
viewers, it would be of interest as to what proportion of viewers actually contribute to the
ministry. Unfortunately, the GSS data upon which this study relies never asks, specifically,
whether or not respondents contributed money to televangelists or religious media figures.24
Hypotheses
Exposure to non-news programs that contain political messages should result in increased
antipathy towards the out-groups mentioned in those broadcasts. As was mentioned in previous
chapters, this expectation stems from an understanding of videomalaise theory and its progeny
(Dahl 1967; Forgette and Morris 2006; Martin 2008; Mutz 2007; Mutz and Reeves 2005;
Robinson1976). It is not anticipated that the increased antipathy towards the out-groups derided
in the broadcasts will be accompanied by a corresponding increase in positive feelings towards
the apparent “in group” from whom the messages are being broadcast; specifically, it is not
anticipated that watching satirical media will lead to stronger positive feelings towards liberal
public figures or groups. In order to demonstrate that consumers of religious media are not
simply socially conservative, Christian members of the Republican Party, it will also be
demonstrated that consuming higher levels of religious media does not correlate significantly
with support for specific planks of the Republican Party’s platform.

24

The GSS did ask how much one contributed to “other religious organizations” and to one’s
own congregation during the same time span as they asked regarding the consumption of
religious broadcasts. However, no statistical significance was found between the amount of time
one spends watching religious media and one’s generosity in contributing to “other religious
organizations” or to one’s own congregation.
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H1: Higher levels of religious media consumption will result in stronger antipathy towards the
out-groups targeted by religious media;
H2: Higher level of religious media consumption will not be significantly correlated with
Republican Party platform positions such as opposition to gun control, support for the
death penalty and support for The Drug War;
H3: Higher levels of satirical media consumption will result in stronger antipathy towards
conservative public figures and social groups;
H4: Higher levels of satirical media consumption will not be significantly correlated with
positive feelings towards liberal public figures or groups.
Data and Methods
In addition to the experiment discussed in the last chapter, this dissertation will also
feature statistical analysis of large, nationally conducted surveys. The data on the consumption of
religious television was assembled and provided by General Social Survey (GSS) of the National
Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago in their General Social Surveys
Cumulative file, 1972-2010. This file provides a total of 55,087 completed interviews with adults
in the United States for analysis, though questions pertaining to watching religious television-“About how much time per week, in hours and minutes, do you normally spend watching
religious shows on television?”--were only asked in the time periods 1988-1991 and again in
1998; a total of 5,813 respondents were asked about watching religious television. Controls for
the respondents’ relevant socio-demographic characteristics--including their partisanship,
ideological preferences, age, gender, income and whether respondents lived in an urban or rural
area--are included in the linear regression models utilized in testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. Age,
gender, residing in a rural area and income have all previously been demonstrated to be
correlated with increased religiosity (Argue, Johnson and White 1999; Chalfant and Heller 1991;
Joshi, Hardy and Hawkins 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995). Age is an interval variable where
respondents are asked their age in years. Gender is a binomial variable coded “1” for male and
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“2” for female. Whether the respondent is from an urban or rural environment is controlled for
using the variable “xnorcsiz,” an ordinal variable where respondents could choose the size of the
city where they reside, from “large central city (over 250,000),” coded “1” to “open country
within larger civil divisions, e.g., township, division,” coded “10.” Income was controlled for
using the ordinal variable, “Income,” where respondents were asked to place their total family
income from all sources before taxes for the last year on a scale running from “Under $1,000,”
coded as “1” to “$60,000 or over,” coded as “20.”25 Controlling for partisanship and ideology
ensures that the statistical analysis is not simply capturing the views of “The Religious Right.”
Partisanship is controlled for using the variable “partyid,” an ordinal variable where respondents
were asked whether they viewed themselves anywhere from “Strong Democrat,” coded “0,” to
“Strong Republican,” coded “7.” Ideology was controlled for using the ordinal variable
“polviews,” where respondents could place themselves on a 7 point scale from “Extremely
Liberal,” coded “1” to “Extremely Conservative,” coded “7.” Additional tests are also conducted
to demonstrate how viewers of religious television are distinct from socially conservative
Republicans.26
The data on the consumption of satirical television was assembled and provided by the
Annenberg Public Policy Center at the University of Pennsylvania in their 2004 NAES 2004
National Annenberg Election Rolling Cross-Sectional Survey. Ninety eight thousand, seven
25

For respondents interviewed after 1990, the income brackets were adjusted and the highest,
still coded as “20” is “$75,000 or over.”
26
It needs to be stressed that this dissertation does not aim to be another study of the Religious
Right. There is already a fine volume of literature on the subject of the Christian Right, much of
which has proven illuminating in providing proper context while performing the necessary
research for this dissertation and inspiring some of the theories and hypotheses tested therein
(Hertzke 1993; Jelen 1993; Klemp 2010; Lienesch 1982: Rozell and Wilcox 1996; Wilcox 1986;
2000). This dissertation is distinct from those works in that it explores the impact media has on
those Americans who utilize religious television, specifically.
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hundred and eleven interviews were conduced with adults in the United States during the
campaign season of 2004 and for two months following the general election. Creating the main
independent variable of interest, respondents were asked how many days in the past week they
watched late night comedy programs “like ‘The Late Show with David Letterman’ ‘The Tonight
Show with Jay Leno’ or ‘The Daily Show with Jon Stewart’.” This is an ordinal variable running
from 0 to 7. A follow-up question then asked which late night comedy program they most often
watched: ‘The Late Show with David Letterman’, ‘The Tonight Show with Jay Leno’, ‘The Daily
Show with Jon Stewart’, ‘Late Night with Conan O’Brien’ or ”Other.” Control variables were
created from the questions respondents were asked regarding their income, education, age,
gender, race, partisanship, ideology, frequency of church attendance and whether they lived in an
urban or rural area. Partisan ID was recoded as a binomial variable27 where Republicans were
coded as “0” and Democrats were coded as “1.” Ideology was controlled for using a 5 point
ordinal scale running from “Very Conservative,” coded as “1” to “Very Liberal,” coded as “5.”28
Education is a nine-point ordinal scale running from “Grade 8 or lower,” coded as “1” to
“Graduate or Professional Degree,” coded as “9.” Gender is a binomial variable where males are
coded as “0” and females are coded as “1.” Age is an interval level variable where the
respondent gave their age in years. Income is a nine-point ordinal scale where respondents were
asked to place their last year’s total household income before taxes on a scale of “Less than
$10,000,” coded as “1,” to “More than $150,000,” coded as “9.” Race is a nominal, five point
variable where Whites are coded as “1.” Race is included in the models essentially to check for

27

Respondents who declared that they were Independents or “Something Else” were excluded
from the models.
28
In the NAES dataset, respondents who said they did not know the answer to a question or who
refused to answer were coded as 998 and 999, respectively. These responses were not included in
the models in this dissertation.
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distinctions between white and non-white respondents. Whether a respondent lives in an urban or
rural environment is controlled using a 3 point ordinal variable where respondents could choose
whether they live in an “urban,” coded as “1,” “suburban,” coded as “2” and “rural,” coded as
“3,” place of residence.
One question relevant to both the GSS and NAES datasets was how to code the
religiosity of the respondents. Both the GSS and NAES ask a series of questions relating to a
respondents’ religious behavior and denomination. Religiosity is relevant to views towards the
out-groups targeted both by religious and satirical media, so finding the appropriate way to
measure religiosity is of the utmost importance. Regarding the use of religious denominations to
classify respondents, this work follows that of Olson and Warber (2008), Layman (1997) and
Blazo and Russo (2013). These authors demonstrated that dividing Americans by denomination
is less useful than observing levels of religious orthodoxy and moral conservatism among the
adherents, regardless of denominational affiliations. Olson and Warber contend, “Conservative
Baptists would have more in common politically with conservative Catholics than they would
with fellow Baptists who are liberal” (Olson and Warber 2008: 193). Keeping this in mind, the
variable constructed to measure religiosity in the GSS dataset includes a measure of Biblical
literalism, as well as how often one prays. The use of this dynamic for gauging Christian
orthodoxy is widespread in the relevant research and provides substantial validity (Bolce and De
Maio 1999; Olson and Warber 2008; Wilcox 1986). One benefit of using biblical literalism is
that it provides a crucial cross-denominational cleavage within the Christian majority of
Americans. Whether the respondent is Protestant, Catholic, or nondenominational, a literal
interpretation of the Bible implies religious conservatism (Hempel and Bartkowski 2008).
Additionally, by looking at how the respondent views the Bible, rather than, for example,
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frequency of attendance to religious services, it is ensured that the measure utilized accounts for
those who are not only devout in practice, but strict in their beliefs as well (Blazo and Russo
2013; Layman 1997; Olson and Warber 2008; Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003).
Unfortunately, the NAES dataset does not contain questions pertaining to the respondents’ views
on Biblical literalism or frequency of prayer. As such, frequency of church attendance is used as
a proxy for a respondents’ religiosity. This is still in keeping with the extant literature in the
field, including Olson and Warber (2008) and conforms with the assertion that denomination is a
less useful measure of religious beliefs than outward characteristics of a respondents’
religiosity.29
The Annenberg dataset being analyzed for satirical media effects contains questions that
allow to control for respondent ideology, income, level of education, age, gender, partisanship,
race and whether or not the respondents lived in an urban, suburban or rural environment.
Previous analyses have shown satirical television to be particularly popular among young, welleducated affluent urbanites, so controlling for these factors is essential (Baumgartner and Morris
2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007; Holbert
et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). Controlling for the
socio-demographic criteria that make one likely to view satirical or religious television programs
is done to demonstrate that, even among the groups most likely to consume these particular nonnews programs with political messages, the consumption of these messages has an impact on
their views towards the out-groups targeted during those broadcasts. Controlling for partisanship
29

It should be kept in mind that the NAES’ question about denomination includes Baptists,
‘Christians’, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Lutherans, Methodists, Presbyterians and non-denominational
Christians all coded as “Protestants.” This encompasses some of the most liberal denominations
in the United States as well as some of the most conservative, particularly when one considers
that many born again and evangelical Christians eschew labels other than “Christian.” This
unwieldy measure was thus not included in the models.
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and ideology will make sure that any results showing respondents’ antipathy towards George W.
Bush or the National Rife Association is not merely a result of the respondents’ own partisanship
or political ideology. Relevant to the present study, respondents were also asked about their
television viewing habits. This includes specific questions regarding the viewing of late-night
comedy programs such as The Daily Show. Respondents were also asked how much they trusted
the two candidates running for President in 2004 (President George W. Bush and Senator John
Kerry), as well as about the personal characteristics of the two candidates. Respondents were
also asked to rate the favorability of groups including corporations, labor unions, the NRA and
“Christian Groups.” How respondents view these different groups--often placed on distinct ends
of ideological and partisan divide--helps demonstrate how satirical programs influence viewers’
feelings towards targeted out-groups as well as potential in-groups.
Breaking away from prior empirical studies of consumers of religious media, this study
will control for the socio-demographic characteristics that seem most associated with watching
religious television programming. Women, those with less money and those who live in rural
areas tend not only to be more inclined to watch religious media; these socio-demographic
groups are also generally just more religious than society as a whole (Argue, Johnson and White
1999; Chalfant and Heller 1991; Joshi, Hardy and Hawkins 2009; Miller and Hoffman 1995). It
seems surprising, then, that prior studies examining the behavior or attitudes of consumers of
religious broadcasting do not control for these characteristics. Additionally, it should hardly be
surprising that the more religious segments of society are more likely to watch religious
broadcasting than the less religious members of society. As mentioned earlier in this chapter,
religiosity in the GSS dataset is measured via an additive variable consisting of how often the
respondent prays and whether the respondent believes the Bible to be the literal word of God.
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Results: Religious Television
Using logit models and data from the GSS circa 1988-1991 and 199830, a series of tests
were conducted. The dependent variable in each of the models were questions from the GSS
related to respondents’ views towards atheists, homosexuals and Communists. This chapter will
focus upon the models pertaining to homosexuals. This is both due to the strong support in the
literature for believing homosexuals to be frequent foils for hosts of religious programs, and for
the purposes of continuity as feelings towards homosexuals were discussed in the previous
chapter.31 Respondents were asked whether they would want to ban books supporting
homosexuals from their local libraries, whether they would allow a homosexual to teach at a
college, and whether they felt homosexual should be allowed to “speak in (their) community.” It
also had to be determined that viewers of religious broadcasts were distinct from the more
religious segments of society, generally, as well as distinct from the sort of person whose sociodemographic characteristics would make them likely to view religious broadcasting. Thus,
controls were included for gender, income, size of respondent’s current place of residence
(city/town/village/etc.), and the religiosity of the respondent. Religiosity was measured via an
additive variable based upon how often the respondent prays and their opinion as to the literalism
of the Bible. Controls were also included for both the political partisanship of the respondents as
well as their political ideology. These latter two controls are in place to ensure that consumers of
religious broadcasting are not simply members of the “Religious Right” of the Republican Party,
self-selecting to consume televised messages that coincide with their political worldview. Tests

30

These were the two panels in which respondents were asked how much time per week, in
hours and minutes, they normally spent watching religious shows on television
31
While frequent viewership of religious television was not significant in effecting respondents’
views on whether atheists or Communists should be allowed to teach a college course, they
remained significant in the predicted directions in the other four models.
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were then conducted in order to see if those who consume religious media hold distinct views
regarding specific out-groups targeted by religious television (Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990; Straub
1988). In each model, increased viewership of religious media causes one to be more likely to
give the answer more hostile towards homosexuals (Table 4.1).
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Table 4.1 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views
Towards Homosexuals
_________________________________________________________________________
Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable
Independent
Variable

Logit
Gays speaking
in community

Logit
Gays teaching a
college course

Constant

0.206
(.510)

0.284
(.462)

Logit
Banning a
book in favor
of
homosexuality
0.333
(0.455)

Watches
Religious TV

–0.214
(0.55)
p = .0001

0.248
(0.558)
p =.0001

–0.224
(0.055)
p = .0001

Income

–0.99
(0.23)
p = .0001

–0.100
(0.21)
p = .0001

0.044
(0.022)
p = .0414

Sex

-0.493
(0.140)
p = .0004
0.014
(0.004)
p = .0005

-0.563
(0.126)
p = .0001
0.020
(0.004)
p = .0001

0.571
(0.123)
p = .0001
-0.015
(0.003)
p = .0001

Urban/Rural

0.136
(1.644)
p = .00001

0.117
(0.021)
p = .0001

-0.083
(0.021)
p = .0001

Religiosity

–0.292
(0.044)
p = .0001

–0.178
(0.036)
p = .0001

0.289
(0.037)
p = .0001

Political
Ideology

0.150
(0.052)
p = .0039

0.138
(0.46)
p = .0029

-0.138
(0.046)
p = .0025

Partisan ID

-0.036
(0.034)
p = .2846
1604
0.131
214.6

-0.019
(0.030)
p = .5353
1588
0.115
220.78

0.089
(0.030)
p = .0032
1593
0.112
219.84

Age

n
Adj. R2
F, χ2
Note:

p –values are for two-tailed tests. The χ2-statistic is shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2
shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated by Stata.
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In a slightly different vein, a regression was also run to see if increased consumption of
religious media had a significant relationship with wanting to ban art “that mocks religion.”
Again, even when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and religiosity, increased
consumption of religious broadcasting leads to increased support of banning said art. These
findings lend support to the first two hypotheses asserted in this chapter; not only does a higher
level of consumption of religious media lead one to hold views and beliefs distinct from
religiously conservative members of society, Republicans and ideological conservatives, but
these beliefs and attitudes are reflected in greater antipathy towards select out-groups.
Hypothesis 2 was tested by way of models analyzing whether increased viewing of
religious television coincided with increased agreement with opinions on secular matters that
tend to find uniform agreement among Republicans. It is understood that there would likely be
some overlap with the Religious Right. However, if we look at all consumers of religious
broadcasting, there may be some sharp distinctions from the Religious Right. For example,
African-Americans are more likely to consume religious broadcasting than White Americans.32
Additionally, it is likely that even within the Religious Right, there may be a large population
that does not consume religious broadcasting, and a smaller group that does. Additional analysis
was conduced with this very question in mind; are frequent consumers of religious television
simply a subset of the Religious Right, or is there a distinct effect coming from consuming the
televised messages? This idea was tested by running logit models where it was examined
whether watching religious television had any significant relationship with three issues
commonly held in the Republican party: Opposition to the legalization of marijuana, opposition

32

See Pew Research Center Survey April 10, 2001, http://people-press.org/report/?pageid=115
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to gun control, and support for the death penalty.33 These are three issues where the Republican
Party had--and remains to have--wholly clear positions (Republican Party Platform of 1988).
Affinity for each of these issues were used as the dependent variable in a series of logit models,
with controls for partisanship, ideology and socio-demographic criteria included, as well as
religious television viewership. Marijuana legalization was coded as “0” for favoring legalization
and “1” for opposition to the legalization of marijuana. Gun control was measured by a binomial
variable wherein respondents were asked whether they supported (coded “0”) or opposed (coded
“1”) potential gun buyers needing a police permit before they could purchase a firearm. Support
for capital punishment was measured by a binomial variable where support for capital
punishment was coded as “0” and opposition to capital punishment was coded “1.”

33

Respondents were asked whether they would “favor or oppose a law which would require a
person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun,” “Do you think the use of
marijuana should be made legal or not” and “Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder”. For each question, respondents were given a choice of “Yes,” “No” or
“Don’t Know”.
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Table 4.2 Logit Estimations Demonstrating the Impact of Religious Media on Views
Towards Republican Platform Positions
_________________________________________________________________________
Cofficient estimate (std. err.) by estimation type and dependent variable
Independent
Variable

Logit
Support gun
buyers needing
police permits

Logit
Favor or oppose
the death penalty

Constant

0.849
(.497)

-0.980
(.385)

Logit
Favor or
oppose
legalization of
marijuana
0.670
(0.489)

Watches
Religious TV

.011
(0.062)
p = .8572

0.116
(0.045)
p =.0105

.065
(0.076)
p = .3898

Income

–0.029
(0.024)
p = .2340

–0.049
(0.018)
p = .0058

0.014
(0.025)
p = .5755

Sex

-.851
(0.133)
p = .0001
-0.003
(0.004)
p = .4009

0.252
(0.104)
p = .0151
-0.003
(0.003)
p = .2543

0.327
(0.130)
p = .0124
.011
(0.004)
p = .0040

Urban/Rural

0.117
(0.023)
p = .00001

-0.044
(0.018)
p = .0164

.113
(0.025)
p = .0001

Religiosity

–0.018
(0.038)
p = .6384

–0.102
(0.03)
p = .0006

-0.208
(0.040)
p = .0001

Political
Ideology

0.130
(0.051)
p = .0102

-0.218
(0.039)
p = .0001

0.322
(0.050)
p = .0001

Partisan ID

0.080
(0.033)
p = .0147
1606
0.0624
102.11

-0.126
(0.026)
p = .0001
2300
0.0552
144.63

-0.020
(0.034)
p = .5687
1573
0.0992
171.61

Age

n
Adj. R2
F, χ2
Note:

p –values are for two-tailed tests. The χ2-statistic is shown for the Logit regression. The Adjusted R2
shown for the Logit regression is the pseudo-R2 estimated by Stata.
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Increased viewing of religious television has no statistically significant relationship with
views on the legalization of marijuana or gun control (Table 4.2). Running contrary to the
standard Republican--and conservative--position of the day, viewing religious television
programming is found to be significantly correlated with opposition to the death penalty (Table
4.2). These results lend support for the assertion that consumers of religious television are not
simply Republicans with peculiar television viewing habits; rather, consumers of religious
broadcasts are a distinct group of the American populace. There is a distinct effect of viewing
religious television broadcasts.
Results: Satirical Television
Running a series of linear regressions on Annenberg data from 2004, greater viewership
of late night comedies was found to be significantly correlated with being male, young, having a
lower level of income Democratic partisan affiliation, living in an urban area, possessing a
liberal ideology, decreased church attendance and increased levels of education. Race was not
found to be significantly correlated with higher levels of watching late night talk shows. These
results are not altogether surprising, considering how the literature has repeatedly found that
satirical programming is the province of the young, “hip” educated urbanite (Baumgartner and
Morris 2006; Cantor 1999; Cao 2008; Carr 1992; Fox and Sahin 2007; Hart and Hartelius 2007;
Holbert et al. 2007; Hollander 2005; LaMarre et al. 2009; Young and Esralew 2011). Additional
linear regressions that controlled for partisan affiliation, ideology, residing in an urban location,
income, education, church attendance, age, gender and race were run, and it was found that those
who watched late night comedies had significantly stronger negative feelings towards President
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George W. Bush. These models used as their dependent variables a variety of questions relating
to President Bush’s personal qualities (See Tables 4.3 and 4.4)34.

34

For each of the opinion questions regarding President George W. Bush and Senator John F.
Kerry, respondents were asked to place on a scale of 0 to 10 how much they agreed with a
provided statement. Respondents were thus asked to place, on a scale of 0 to 10, how much they
agreed with the statement that Bush was trustworthy, knowledgeable, out of touch, arrogant,
reckless and that President Bush “shared their values”. Similar questions were asked of
respondents about Senator Kerry.
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Table 4.3. OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George
W. Bush: Positive Personality Traits
Coefficient estimates (std. err.) by dependent variable
Independent
Variable

Feelings that Bush
is trustworthy

Feelings that Bush shares
respondents’ values

Feelings that Bush
is knowledgeable

Constant

9.60
(0.095)

9.841
(0.094)

10.158
(0.103)

Watching
Late Night
Comedy

–0.046
(0.008)
p = .0001

–0.045
(0.008)
p =.0001

–0.106
(0.009)
p = .0001

Party ID

-3.906
(0.033)
p = .0001

–4.072
(0.033)
p = .0001

-3.083
(0.036)
p = .0001

Ideology

-0.722
(0.016)
p = .0001

-0.847
(0.016)
p = .0001

–0.672
(0.017)
p = .0001

Income

0.024
(0.008)
p = .0020

0.036
(0.008)
p = .0001

-0.032
(0.008)
p = .0001

Education

-0.085
(0.007)
p = .0001

–0.084
(0.007)
p = .0001

0.188
(0.008)
p = .0001

Age

0.004
(0.0009)
p = .0001

–0.001
(0.0009)
p = .1471

-0.001
(0.001)
p = .1645

Gender

0.083
(0.029)
p = .0039

0.189
(0.028)
p = .0001

0.33
(0.031)
p = .0001

Race

-0.068
(0.017)
p = .0001

-0.05
(0.017)
p = .0036

-0.019
(0.019)
p = .2983

Urban or
Rural

0.154
(0.020)
p = .0001

0.158
(0.020)
p = .0001

0.213
(0.022)
p = .0001

n
Adj. R2
F

34,844
0.470
3433.63

34,746
.510
4022.57

27,531
.405
2086.77

Note:

p –values are for two-tailed tests.
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Table 4.4. OLS Results of Late Night Comedy’s Impact on Views Towards George
W. Bush: Negative Personality Traits
Coefficient estimates (std. err.) by dependent variable
Independent
Variable

Feelings that Bush
is out of touch

Feelings that Bush is
reckless

Feelings that Bush
is arrogant

Constant

1.847
(0.153)

1.355
(0.124)

1.775
(0.152)

Watching
Late Night
Comedy

0.054
(0.014)
p = .0001

0.54
(0.011)
p = .0001

0.066
(0.014)
p = .0001

Party ID

2.308
(0.054)
p = .0001

2.584
(0.044)
p = .0001

2.767
(0.054)
p = .0001

Ideology

0.711
(0.026)
p = .0001

0.662
(0.021)
p = .0001

0.691
(0.26)
p = .0001

Income

-0.04
(0.126)
p = .0016

-0.02
(0.010)
p = .0524

0.012
(0.013)
p = .3524

Education

0.073
(0.011)
p = .0001

0.100
(0.009)
p = .0001

0.107
(0.011)
p = .0001

Age

-0.002
(0.001)
p = .1676

-0.003
(0.001)
p = .0040

-0.004
(0.001)
p = .0050

Gender

-0.109
(0.046)
p = .0193

-0.316
(0.038)
p = .0001

-0.356
(0.046)
p = .0001

Race

-0.036
(0.028)
p = .2077

0.027
(0.023)
p = .2301

-0.043
(0.028)
p = .1285

Urban or
Rural

-0.065
(0.032)
p = .0455

-0.088
(0.026)
p = .0008

-0.051
(0.032)
p = .1164

n
Adj. R2
F

21,312
.209
626.30

27,488
.260
1067.82

19,191
.269
786.80

Note:

p –values are for two-tailed tests.
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It should be noted that viewership of late night comedies remained significant in each of
these models, even as variables known to affect one’s political opinions--such as race, income
and residing in an urban location--would drop out of significance during some of the tests.
Frequent viewership of late night talk shows was also significantly correlated with negative
views of “Christian groups,” even when all of the controls in the previous six models were
included in the model. The consumption of satirical media did not have a statistically significant
impact on viewers’ feelings towards corporations, though it did run in the predicted, negative
direction.
In a deviation from the hypotheses, it was found that viewing late night talk shows was
significantly related with positive views towards 2004 Democratic Party Presidential candidate,
Senator John F. Kerry of Massachusetts. Exposure to late night talk shows was found to have a
significant positive relationship with views towards Senator Kerry’s knowledge, trust in Senator
Kerry and a belief that Senator John Kerry shared their values. These findings would seem to
counter the contention proffered in this dissertation that, while television can increase negative
feelings towards out-groups held up for ridicule, it is not likely to engender similar positive
feelings towards in groups likely to be simpatico with the viewing audience. However, there are
questionable results in looking for a similar relationship between viewing late night comedic talk
shows and social groups that can be seen as liberal. Watching late night comedic talks shows was
not found to be significant in a series of models where the dependent variables were feelings
towards labor unions, environmental groups and Congressional Democrats35, respectively.

35

For each of the “group favorability” questions, respondents were asked to place the group on a
scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the lowest possible score. When asked about Congressional
Democrats, however, respondents were asked whether they “strongly approved,” “somewhat
approved,” “somewhat disapproved” or “strongly disapproved” of how the Democrats in
Congress were performing. As such, this variable is an ordinal variable that runs from 1 to 4.
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However, increased viewership of late night comedic talk shows was significantly correlated
with warmer feelings towards homosexual groups and feminist groups. These findings warrant a
revisiting of the Baum (2005) piece that was distinguished from this dissertation in an earlier
chapter.
One of the points raised in Baum (2005) was that candidates for political office appear
on talk shows in order to show their more “human” side, and subsequently curry favor with the
public. Senator John Kerry appeared on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno, The Daily Show with
John Stewart and The Late Show with David Letterman during the campaign season. President
George W. Bush appeared on none of the above-mentioned programs, or any other comedic late
night talk shows, during the 2004 campaign season.36 It is thus possible that, even in the conflictdriven, negative world of television, personal appearances by a public figure can neutralize the
otherwise negative vitriol that is broadcast over the airwaves.
As was mentioned earlier in this dissertation, there was been a recent spate of research
centered on The Daily Show (Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Fox et al. 2007; Holbert et al. 2007;
LaMarre et al. 2009; Landreville, Holbert and LaMarre 2010; Moy et al. 2005, 2006; Young
2004; Young and Tisinger 2006). In light of this interest in The Daily Show, the effects of this
program in particular warrant consideration. Some might even argue that while Jon Stewart’s
program is political, the other talk shows included in this dataset (The Tonight Show with Jay
Leno, Late Night with Conan O’Brien, The Late Show with David Letterman and “Other”) are

36

President Bush’s press secretary, Dana Perino, stated that President Bush, liked and respected
the late night comedy programs, but he never went on them. “President Bush didn’t go on until
after the presidency was over,” said Perino. “He just didn’t think it was a place where the
president should be. And also, they’re dangerous” (Rothman 2012). However, then-candidate for
president Governor George W. Bush appeared on The Tonight Show with Jay Leno in 2000
(Feldman 2012).
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not political. The question to be addressed is: is Stewart’s program driving the appearance that
late night comedic talk shows cause negative opinions of conservative figures and groups? While
this does not appear to necessarily be the case, The Daily Show does have some singular affects.
The question on viewing late night talk shows was used to generate different dummy variables;
one where viewing Stewart’s show was coded “1” and viewership of any of the other listed
programs (Leno’s program, O’Brien’s, Letterman’s and “other) was coded “0.” Similar variables
were created for each of the other programs, plus “other.” For each of these models, “other” was
not included. Controls for partisan affiliation, ideology, age, income, urbanity, education, gender
and race were included in each of the models. All of the tables presenting the results of these
models can be found in the appendix of this dissertation.
When analyzing each of the late night talk shows individually, it is found that only The
Daily Show remains significant in the predicted direction in thinking that President Bush does
not share the same values as the viewer. Similar results are produced when analyzing the impact
of late night talk shows on feelings towards the National Rifle Association (NRA). While there is
no statistically significant relationship between watching late night talk shows and feelings
towards the NRA when the looking at each of the programs individually, there is a negative,
statistically significant relationship between viewing The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and
feelings towards the NRA; none of the other talk shows produced a significant result. Similarly,
when the dependent variable is the respondents’ agreement with the statement that President
George W. Bush is trustworthy, Stewart’s program has a significant relationship and runs in the
predicted direction . Viewing The Daily Show was found to be significantly, positively correlated
with feeling that President George W. Bush is “reckless”. However, Viewership of The Daily
Show was not significantly correlated with negative feelings towards “Christian Groups,” despite
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the finding that viewing late night satirical talk shows was significantly related to negative
feelings towards these groups.
Conclusion
Experimental designs are said to be high in internal validity, but low in external validity.
As a way of adding to the external validity and generalizability of the results presented in the last
chapter, large-n cross-sectional data culled from nationally conducted surveys was tested with a
variety of OLS and ordered logit models. The results of these tests largely support the hypotheses
presented at the beginning of the chapter. Increased viewership of non-news programs that
contain political messages--in this case, religious television and satirical television--leads to
increased antipathy towards the societal out-groups presented for scorn or ridicule during the
broadcasts. Even among the segments of society likely to view religious television, analysis of
GSS data demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between increased viewership of
religious television and antipathy towards homosexuals. It was also demonstrated that consumers
of religious television are not simply socially conservative, Christian members of the Republican
Party, as there was no significant relationship between viewing religious television and support
for various platforms of the Republican Party’s presidential platform.
Analysis of the NAES datasets demonstrating statistically significant relationships
between increased viewership of comedic late night comedy programs and negative feelings
towards a variety of conservative public figures and groups. These results were determined when
controlling for not only partisanship and ideology, but also the socio-demographic characteristics
that make one likely to view satirical programming. Tests demonstrated mixed results in showing
a relationship between viewership of satirical programs and increased positive feelings towards
liberal and Democratic groups and figures. It appears that Baum (2005) may warrant further
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consideration, as appearances by a public figure on a non-news program may cause the viewing
public to feel more favorably towards that figure.
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CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

Political scientists, as well as other social scientists, have produced a thorough canon of
scholarship exploring the impact that political advertisements, nightly and cable news, and
campaign coverage can have on the audience. The motivation behind writing this dissertation
was to address the impact that non-news programs, the vast majority of what is shown on
television, have upon television viewers. If non-news programs are influencing the political
views of millions of television viewers, it would behoove political scientists to study how and in
what manner these views are being manipulated.
As was stated at the beginning of this dissertation, at the core of this research are the
assertions that media effects are real and the role that non-news programs play in influencing
their viewers warrants empirical examination. The research presented in the preceding chapters
has helped demonstrate both of these assertions. Hypotheses based on the above assertions were
tested through the use of an experimental design and the analysis of large-n cross-sectional data.
Both iterations have shown that exposure to non-news programming that contains political
messages leads to viewers’ increased antipathy towards the social out-groups targeted for scorn
or ridicule in those programs. Due to the divisive, conflict-laden version of reality presented by
television, it was not expected that non-news programs containing political messages would lead
to greater warmth toward the groups presenting the messages. This hypothesis was further
informed by the power of affect in the decision making process, particularly the importance that
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negative emotional reactions have in influencing how people feel towards certain people or
ideas. This hypothesis was supported by the findings in chapters three and four.
Chapter Three presents intriguing evidence of the impact that non-news programs can
have on a viewing audience. The results of the experiment also provide strong support for the
argument that the effect of non-news programs is not merely a symptom of “self-selection.” It is
acknowledged that the design dealt with a fairly small sample size, roughly 175 respondents. The
sample was also disproportionately Democratic, which could have impacted some of the findings
and may have somewhat weakened the generalizability of the findings. The partisan skew may
also have been a reason for the unexpected results.
Future research could help explore some of the unexpected results of the experimental
design. Exposure to the religious media treatment resulted in significantly more negative
feelings towards homosexuals and gay marriage and no resulting increased empathy for Christian
conservatives or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints. These results support the
hypotheses made in chapter three. As religious television targets certain social groups in
describing a “righteous we vs. sinful others” view of the world (Bruce 1990; Hughey 1990;
Straub 1988), exposure to these messages will then cause viewers to view the “others,” or outgroups, with disdain. However, due to the divisive, critical nature of television, viewers are not
expected to also rally around the “we” to whom religious television alludes (McLuhan 1964;
Dahl 1967 Robinson 1976). When the respondents were then divided by political party, it was
revealed that exposure to the treatment had no statistically significant impact on Republican
respondents, but caused a significant decline in positive feelings towards homosexuals and gay
marriage among Democrats.
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Democratic respondents’ statistically significantly lower feelings towards homosexuals
and gay marriage after viewing the religious media treatment raises many questions that warrant
additional study. Are Democrats more likely than Republicans to have their minds changed by
what they see on television? Is Robertson simply a highly persuasive and effective figure? Is the
purpose of televangelism--harkening back to its revival tent roots--to win new converts, while
other forms of non-news programs with political messaging are geared more towards “preaching
to the choir?” Is there a kind of “saturation point” whereby ones opinions are crystallized to the
point where new information--even information with which they agree--will not cause any real
change in opinion (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992; 1993)? Future studies could also explore
whether there is also a “backlash” effect of being exposed to visual materials that contradict a
viewers’ previously held beliefs or mock groups or figures to whom a viewer feels positively.
While the results were not statistically significant--possibly due to the small sample size of
Republicans--Republicans who were exposed to the satirical treatment became more fond of
Mormons and conservative Christians than those who were not exposed to the treatment. This
result may also have been due to the timing of the experimental design and the political
landscape in the fall of 2012. Republican Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney is a Mormon, and
his religion was on display during his presidential campaign. Republican respondents may have
seen the jibes at the Mormon faith as being subtle jokes at their preferred candidate’s expense.
The analysis of the cross-sectional data in Chapter Four presents evidence that even
among the sub-sets of the American population who view religious and satirical media, there are
distinct effects of consuming those messages. Viewers of both religious and satirical programs
are more likely to hold negative feelings towards the figures and members of society typically
targeted for ridicule and derision in those programs. The results of the National Annenberg
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Election Survey (NAES) data presents some mixed results in terms of whether consuming
satirical media leads to increased warmth towards liberal public figures. It is possible that
making appearances on late night comedic talk shows, as Senator Kerry did in 2004, mitigates
the flow of otherwise negative, “snarky” messages from those television programs. Future
research projects could explore this possibility more fully.
This dissertation could lead to further empirical evaluations of how televised
entertainment can mold audiences’ views towards certain segments of society. While this
dissertation only explores two case studies, religious and satirical media, numerous other
television program formats warrant examination. As mentioned earlier in the dissertation, there is
scant empirical examination of television sitcoms. Popular and ubiquitous formats, such as crime
drama/police procedurals, have also been known to offer commentary on topical political issues.
The long-running program Law & Order, which also spawned a series of successful and popular
spin-off programs such as Law & Order: SVU, often interwove real-life events into the drama by
basing plots on real life crime or issues that are “ripped from the headlines” (Conroy 2009; Farhi
2009). The impact that entertainment programs such as Law & Order have on the audience’s
views of different political issues may be significant; conservative pundits and bloggers alike
have long chronicled a supposed liberal slant to the Law & Order franchise (Edroso 2010). If this
popular series did consistently frame issues in a partisan manner, how did this influence the
audience? The police procedural format is not an obvious vehicle for delivering political
messages, but may nonetheless warrant examination. If Law & Order was able to broadcast
political messages in the context of a police program for roughly two decades, what other
seemingly innocuous television formats are also presenting political messages?
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Future scholars could also modify the experimental design in order to address questions
that this dissertation largely left alone. Television viewers do not watch their preferred programs
in one-time, three-minute bursts. Rather, favorite programs are watched routinely over the course
of months or even years. As such, the opinions and outlooks of the television audience are not
being molded due to one-dose treatments, but subtly molded over time. Being able to repeatedly
expose a panel of respondents to treatments over a fixed period of time would allow a researcher
to examine whether there is a change in outlooks or opinions when respondents receive more
than a brief, single treatment. Future studies could also try to incorporate the idea of “media
choice” into the experimental design. In the real world, television viewers have the option of
watching a single program or “grazing” and changing from one program to the next. Being able
to account for this behavior in the context of analyzing the impact that non-news programs can
have on views towards targeted out-groups would add to the results of this dissertation (Forgette,
Morris and Russo 2013).
Future works could also test the degree to which videomalaise plays a role in
entertainment media’s shaping of audiences’ views. For example, do programs like Will and
Grace serve a role in humanizing and normalizing homosexuals to a “middle America” audience,
or do they hold up the behavior of homophobes as being distasteful? Presenting homophobes or
those opposed to gay marriage as buffoonish or repellent could motivate audiences to adopt
positions in favor of gay rights. The results of the experiment and analysis of the cross-sectional
data in this dissertation indicate that television does not increase positive attitudes for groups and
individuals in society, but can increase negative opinions of certain segments of society. It would
be expected that comedies such as Will and Grace would not cause viewers to have positive
feelings towards homosexuals, but could increase the antipathy one feels towards homophobes or
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those opposed to gay marriage. The normative question of the repercussions of what it means
that television could be used into essentially shaming the American public into tolerance--or
towards a healthier lifestyle, or into voting more or skipping church less frequently--is one that
may be equally at home in a televised satire such as The King of the Hill than in a journal of
political studies. Regardless of these normative implications, ironic or otherwise, there are still
many questions to be explored in this field.
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In my experiment, respondents were asked to place on a 100 point feeling thermometer
how they felt towards the two major party candidates for president in 2012; President Barack
Obama and Governor Mitt Romney, whether they considered themselves “a liberal, a
conservative or somewhere in between” (with options available for “very liberal/conservative,”
liberal/conservative, and “slightly liberal/conservative”), 5 questions pertaining to their political
knowledge (name of the Vice President of the United States, the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom, which party had the majority of in the House of Representatives in 2012, which
United States institution has the responsibility for determining the constitutionality of laws and
which of the two major parties in the United States is more conservative on the national level),
how often they attend religious services apart from special events such as weddings and funerals,
whether they consider themselves Republican, Democratic or Independent (if Independent,
whether they “lean” to one of the two major parties, if they consider themselves a member of one
of the two major parties, whether they were “strong” or “weak”), whether they consider their
permanent place of residence as urban/suburban/small town or rural, whether they believe the
Bible to be the literal Word of God, to be inspired by God, or to be a book of legends and fables,
how many hours a week they watched TV news programs, religious television programs such as
“Praise the Lord” and “The 700 Club” and how many hours a week they watched late night
comedic talk shows such as “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” or “Late Night with David
Letterman,” their age, whether or not they were still dependents of their parents, their total
household income the previous year, which state (or nation) they were from, and their race.
After then being exposed to one of three video clips (Pat Robertson discussing California’s
Proposition 8, Jon Stewart discussing California’s Proposition 8 or a local news channel’s
coverage of Proposition 8, respondents were then asked to place on scale that ran from “Strongly
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Disagree” to “Strongly Agree” whether they felt that marriages between same-sex couples
should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as traditional marriages. The
survey ended with feeling thermometers, as respondents were then given 100-point feeling
thermometers asking them to indicate their feelings towards the media, the Church of Latter-Day
Saints, Homosexuals, Conservative Christians and Atheists37, and then their feelings as to
Liberals, Conservatives, The Republican Party and The Democratic Party.38

As part of a research project we are conducting a brief survey. We ask that you answer the following
questions, watch the enclosed video clip, and then answer another series of questions. The entire survey
should take no more than 10 minutes. Your participation is entirely voluntary, and would be greatly
appreciated. Your responses are wholly anonymous.

1. On a scale of 0-100, how do you feel about each of the presidential candidates? The higher the number,
the more favorable you feel towards the candidate. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel towards
him. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards that candidate.
Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings.

(0-100 scale “Feelings Towards President Barack Obama”)
(0-100 scale “Feelings Towards Governor Mitt Romney”)
2. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a liberal, a conservative, or somewhere in between?
-Very Liberal
-Liberal
-Slightly Liberal
-Moderate, Middle of the Road
-Slightly Conservative
-Conservative
-Very Conservative
3. Who is the current Vice President of the United States
-John Roberts
-Joseph Biden
-Rick Perry
-Harry Reid
-Sarah Palin
-Don’t Know

37
38

The order of these categories were randomized for each respondent
The order of these categories were randomized for each respondent
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4. Who is the current Prime Minister of the United Kingdom?
-David Cameron
-Stephen Harper
-Tony Blair
-Nicolas Sarkozy
-Don’t Know
5. Which political party currently has a majority in the United States House of Representatives?
-The Democratic Party
-The Republican Party
-The Tea Party
-No political party has a majority in the United States House of Representatives
-Don’t Know
6. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?
-The President of the United States
-The United States Senate
-The United States House of Representatives
-The Supreme Court of the United States
-Don’t Know
7. Would you say one party is more conservative than the other at the national level? If so, which one?
-The Democratic Party
-The Republican Party
-Don’t Know
8. How often do you attend religious services, apart from special events like weddings and funerals-more
than once a week, once a week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?

-More than once a week
-Once a week
-Once or twice a month
-Few times a year
-Never
-Don’t Know
9. Do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent?
-Republican
-Democrat
-Independent
10. (If Republican is selected) Would you describe yourself as strongly Republican, or not very strongly
Republican?

-Strong Republican
-Weak Republican
10. (If Democrat is selected) Would you describe yourself as strongly Democratic, or not very strongly
Democratic?
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-Strong Democrat
-Weak Democrat
10. (If Independent is selected) Do you think of yourself as being closer to the Republican or Democratic
Party, or neither?

-Independent/Leans Democratic
-Independent
-Independent/Leans Republican
11. Would you describe your permanent place of residence as urban, suburban or rural?
-Urban
-Suburban
-Small Town
-Rural
12. Which of these statements come closest in describing your feelings about the Bible?
-The Bible is the actual word of God, and is meant to be taken literally, word for word
-The Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it should be taken literally, word
for word
-The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral precepts recorded by man
-Don’t Know
13. For each of the following types of television program, please indicate how many hours per week you
spend watching them.

(Scale of 0-10) Television news programs
(Scale of 0-10) Religious television programs, such as “Praise the Lord” or “The 700 Club”
(Scale of 0-10) Late night comedic talk shows such as “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart” or
“Late Night with David Letterman”
14. What is your age?
15. Are you still a dependent of your parents?
-Yes
-No
16. (If Yes) By your best estimate, what was the total income of your parents/guardians last year, before
taxes?

-Less than $10,000
-$10,000-$15,000
-$15,000-$25,000
-$25,000-$35,000
-$35,000-$50,000
-$50,000-$75,000
-$75,000-$100,000
-$100,000-$150,000
-More than $150,000
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16. (If No) By your best estimate, what was your total household income last year before taxes?
-Less than $10,000
-$10,000-$15,000
-$15,000-$25,000
-$25,000-$35,000
-$35,000-$50,000
-$50,000-$75,000
-$75,000-$100,000
-$100,000-$150,000
-More than $150,000
17. What is your gender?
-Male
-Female
18. Which state are you from? (If you are from outside the United States, please state your country of origin)
19. What is your race?
-White/Non-Hispanic
-African-American
-Hispanic
-Asian
-Other (fill in blank)
20. The text provided with each of the three video clips: Please watch the above clip before
proceeding to the next part of the questionnaire. Hit the Play button in the lower left-hand corner of the video
screen. Please be patient, as the clip may take a minute or two to load. Please watch the whole clip before
clicking the button below to proceed.
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree with the following statement. Check only one response.
21. Marriages between same-sex couples should be recognized by the law as valid, with the same rights as
traditional marriages.

-Strongly Disagree
-Disagree
-Neither Agree nor Disagree
-Agree
-Strongly Agree
22. On a scale of 0 to 100, please indicate how you feel about each of the following groups. The higher the
number, the more favorable you feel towards that group. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel
towards them. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards the
selected group. Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings.

(Scale 0-100) The Church of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons)
(Scale 0-100) Homosexuals
(Scale 0-100) Atheists
(Scale 0-100) Conservative Christians
(Scale 0-100) The media
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23. On a scale of 0 to 100, please indicate how you feel about each of the following groups. The higher the
number, the more favorable you feel towards that group. The lower the number, the less favorable you feel
towards them. A score of 50 should indicate that you feel neither favorably nor unfavorably towards the
selected group. Please set the bar to the number that best corresponds to your feelings.

(Scale 0-100) Liberals
(Scale 0-100) Conservatives
(Scale 0-100) The Republican Party
(Scale 0-100) The Democratic Party
Thank you very much for your participation in our survey. In accordance with University of
Mississippi guidelines, we would like to assure you that your participation will be kept anonymous. If you
are interested in the results of this survey, you may contact Mr. Salvatore Russo at sjrusso@go.olemiss.edu
Your code for completing this survey

(Respondent was then provided with a randomly generated code)
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